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PRESCRIPTION DRUG CONTROL
UNDER THE FEDERAL CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES ACT: A WEB OF
ADMINISTRATIVE, CIVIL, AND
CRIMINAL LAW CONTROLS
DOUGLAS J. BEHR*
INTRODUCrION
The abuse of prescription medication by the famous and the un-
known ranges from the bathroom to the street corner. It is a signifi-
cant problem that garners little attention in American society.
Abusers of prescription medication include generally law-abiding
citizens hooked on medication overprescribed or misprescribed by
their family physician as well as hardened drug addicts.' The follow-
ing facts provide evidence of the scope of the problem:
* Copyright © 1994 Douglas J. Behr. Mr. Behr is a partner in the Washington,
D.C., law firm of Keller and Heckman where his practice includes white collar
criminal defense and civil litigation. Mr. Behr spent 12 years as an Assistant United
States Attorney in the District of Columbia where he was involved in the
prosecution of violations of the federal Controlled Substances Act by health care
professionals.
This Article does not address persons who conduct research with controlled
substances, persons who manufacture controlled substances, or persons involved in
narcotic treatment programs. This Article is dedicated to the memory of Stephen E.
Stone, Esquire, former Associate General Counsel at the Drug Enforcement
Administration, a friend. His wise counsel will be missed.
1. See Saralie Faivelson, Hooked on Pain Relief, NEw CHOICES FOR THE BEST
YEARS, Feb. 1991, at 50-51.
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* The 1990 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse revealed
that approximately 24 million members of the household population
of the United States had used psychotherapeutic drugs illicitly on at
least one occasion, 8.6 million had used them in the year prior to the
survey, and 2.9 million had used them in the past month;2
• Between 26-45% of visits to hospital emergency rooms between
1985 and 1989 which involved a controlled substance were attributa-
ble to the use of pharmaceuticals;3
a Pharmaceuticals resulted in an estimated 88,000 hospital emer-
gency room visits in 1988 and 1989 - twice the number of hospital
emergency room visits for heroin and more than 22 times those for
LSD;4
* Anton Furst, the Oscar-winning Art Director of the 1989 film
"Batman" committed suicide in 1992, reportedly after more than
twenty years of dependence on Valium;5 and
* The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and state agencies
prosecute or revoke the license of hundreds of physicians each year
for illegal drug activities.6
Prescription medication is a very attractive street drug. As Con-
gressman Pete Stark, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Health, noted, "Given an option between a white powder of un-
known origin and quality and a pill with a manufacturer's logo,
made under U.S. government quality control, the decision for the
abuser is easy."7 In part because of this attraction, the black market
for such drugs is extremely lucrative.8 The mark-up is substantial.
For instance, the drug commercially named Dilaudid, a synthetic
morphine made by Knoll Pharmaceutical, has a retail value in the
2. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: HIGHLIGHTs 1990, at
35 (1991). "The summary measure 'non-medical use of any psychotherapeutic
drugs' includes use of prescription-type psychotherapeutic drugs such as stimulants,
sedatives, tranquilizers, and analgesics without a doctor's prescription or in amounts
or for purposes other than prescribed." Id. at 3.
3. Pete Stark, U.S. Taxpayers Are Funding Prescription Drug Abuse, U.S.A. To-
DAY: MAO. OF THE AM. SCENE, July 1991, at 88.
4. Id. at 89.
5. Betsy Sharkey, Anton Furst: Lost in the Dream Factory, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1992, § 2, at 1.
6. Stark, supra note 3, at 89.
7. Id. at 88.
8. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
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District of Columbia area of approximately one dollar per four mil-
ligram tablet. One tablet of Dilaudid is sold on the streets of the
District of Columbia for approximately forty dollars.
Abuse of prescription drugs varies socio-economically and geo-
graphically. First, the so-called "suburban housewife" abuses a dif-
ferent drug than the street addict. The suburban housewife
primarily abuses tranquilizers and sedatives obtained from a pri-
mary care physician. When physicians are asked to identify the
most abused drug, they generally identify Valium or another tran-
quilizer. The street addict generally abuses narcotic pain-killers or
amphetamine-type drugs. Second, street abuse of prescription drugs
in one city may be different than abuse in another city. In the 1970s,
heroin addicts in the District of Columbia would mix Preludin with
relatively weak heroin to give the heroin a boost. A large quantity
of the Preludin on the streets of the District of Columbia came from
Philadelphia, where Preludin was not abused on the streets. Simi-
larly, "T's and Blues," a combination of Talwin, an analgesic con-
trolled substance, and pyribenzamine, an antihistamine, were
combined to create a substitute for heroin. T's and Blues were pop-
ular in the St. Louis area but were virtually unknown in the District
of Columbia.9
The federal government has grappled with prescription drug
abuse for some time.1" As part of the effort to control this problem,
the federal government has investigated its nature and extent. In
1965, a Senate Report relating to stimulants and barbiturates noted
that:
[O]ver 9 billion barbiturates and amphetamine tablets are pro-
duced annually in the United States. It is estimated that over
50 percent, or 4 1/2 billion tablets, are distributed through illicit
channels.
9. See United States v. Roth, 777 F.2d 1200, 1201 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding
conviction of pharmacist accused of unlawfully distributing 400,000 tablets of Talwin
and 264,000 tablets of pyribenzamine from his drug store in the St. Louis area).
Knowledge of the lack of abuse in the District of Columbia is based on the author's
personal experience investigating drug abuse in the District and on conversations
with police investigators.
10. See infra notes 21-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal anti-
drug efforts. State governments have addressed this problem as well. Many states
have passed legislation similar to the federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970,
often modelled after the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. See UNIF. CON-
TROLLED SuBsTANCEs ACT, 9 U.L.A. 1 (1990). These state statutes are beyond the
scope of this Article.
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The human toll of drug abuse cannot be measured for it af-
fects not only the abuser but his family and the community
around him. Drug abuse is closely bound up with juvenile de-
linquency. It also contributes to the rising crime rate in the
United States. Misuse of these drugs has contributed to the ris-
ing accidents on the highways.
The illegal traffic in drugs is enormously profitable. Barbitu-
rates and amphetamines having a retail value of approximately
$670 sell in illicit channels for in excess of $250,000.11
The House of Representatives noted that in 1969, the level of am-
phetamine and barbiturate diversion had not changed from the fifty
percent level reported four years earlier. 2
In 1984, the Senate, in discussing the need to amend the Con-
trolled Substances Act,'" reported that:
Diversion of legally produced drugs into illicit channels is a ma-
jor part of the drug abuse problem in the United States. It is
estimated that between 60 and 70 percent of all drug-related
deaths and injuries involve drugs that were originally part of
the legitimate drug production and distribution chain. Also, di-
version of legally produced drugs often evidences the same sort
of large-scale trafficking more commonly associated with the
trade in wholly illicit drugs. For example, the Justice Depart-
ment informed the committee that 21 practicing practitioners
registered to dispense controlled substances convicted as a re-
sult of an investigation named "Operation Script" were respon-
sible for the diversion of approximately 21.6 million dosage
units of controlled substances.
[I]t is estimated that 80 to 90 percent of all current diver-
sion occurs at [the practitioner] level.14
Congressman Gilman commented that,
11. S. REP. No. 337, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1895, 1896.
12. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4572.
13. The Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-978 (1988)).
14. S. ReP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 261-62 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,3443-44.
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Evidence suggests that prescription drugs diverted by legitimate
medical distributors to the illicit drug market account for about
three-fourths of the deaths and injuries due to drug abuse.15
In 1986, Congress observed that "at least 7 million individuals reg-
ularly use prescription drugs, mostly addictive ones, without medical
supervision.' 6 Congress established the current system of control
in response to pervasive abuse of prescription drugs. The current
system is:
Designed to improve the administration and regulation of the
manufacturing, distribution and dispensing of controlled sub-
stances by providing for a "closed" system of drug distribution
for legitimate handlers of such drugs. Such a closed system
should significantly reduce the widespread diversion of these
drugs out of legitimate channels into the illicit market....
This system of control seeks to limit the abuse of prescription medi-
cation in three ways through administrative, civil, and criminal re-
straints. First, it limits the quantity of prescription drugs that are
produced each year. Annual quotas are established for the manu-
facture of controlled substances in Schedules I and II Second, the
system defines those situations in which such drugs can be legally
prescribed or administered to persons in need. 9 Third, the system
attempts to deter individuals from obtaining such drugs from legiti-
mate sources for other than legitimate needs.2°
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The federal government first established controls over medication
at the turn of the century. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 190621
made it illegal to ship misbranded or adulterated food or drugs in
15. 130 CONG. REc. H9681 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Gilman).
16. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 6006(a)(2), 100 Stat.
3207-160, quoted in Historical and Statutory Notes, 21 U.S.C.A. § 801 (Supp. 1993).
17. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4571-72.
18. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.01-1303.27 (1993).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 829 (1988).
20. The Act makes it illegal to obtain controlled substances by "misrepresenta-
tion, fraud, forgery or subterfuge." 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3) (1988).
21. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), repealed by
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, § 902, 52 Stat. 1040, 1059
(1938).
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interstate commerce. In 1914, Congress passed the Harrison Nar-
cotic Act,' which solely regulated narcotic drugs. The federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, enacted in 1938, required prescriptions for
all habit-forming drugs, particularly narcotics and barbiturates.24
Regulation was substantially expanded with the 1965 Drug Abuse
Control Amendments.' As discussed in more detail below, both
the Harrison Narcotic Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act applied to the prescription and distribution of medicine
by physicians and pharmacists.26
The Harrison Narcotic Act prohibited the dispensation or distri-
bution of narcotic drugs without a written order on a form provided
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.27 This prohibition did
not apply in certain situations, including:
(a) To the dispensing or distribution of any of the aforesaid
drugs to a patient by a physician ... registered under this act in
the course of his professional practice only... [or]
(b) To the sales, dispensing, or distribution of any of the afore-
said drugs by a dealer to a consumer under and in pursuance of
a written prescription issued by a physician.2 8
Courts upheld the constitutionality of the Harrison Narcotic Act
as applied to physicians and pharmacists, and thus provided the
22. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 2, 34 Stat. at 768.
23. Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914), repealed by Con-
trolled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1291 (1970).
24. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 502, 52 Stat. 1040, 1050, amended
by Controlled Substances Act, § 701, 84 Stat. at 1281-82. See infra notes 32-36 and
accompanying text.
25. Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, §§ 3-5,79 Stat.
226, 227-33 (1965). See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 99 (1919) (holding Harrison
Narcotic Act applicable to physicians and pharmacists); White v. United States, 399
F.2d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding physicians liable for prescribing drugs outside
the normal and ordinary course of business under Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act); United States v. DeFreese, 270 F.2d 730, 733-35 (5th Cir. 1959) (applying Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to wholesale as well as retail pharmacist transac-
tions); Brown v. United States, 250 F.2d 745, 746 (5th Cir.) (holding licensed
physician liable for dispensing drugs covered by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act without a prescription), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
27. Ch. 1, §§ 1-5, 38 Stat. 785, 785-88 (1914), repealed by Controlled Substances
Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1291 (1970).
28. Harrison Narcotic Act § 2.
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foundation for the future control of such professionals.29 Under the
Act, a physician's conduct was judged by a good faith standard.3"
The Supreme Court stated,
Manifestly the phrases "to a patient" and "in the course of his
professional practice only" are intended to confine the immu-
nity of a registered physician, in dispensing the narcotic drugs
mentioned in the act, strictly within the appropriate bounds of a
physician's professional practice, and not to extend it to include
a sale to a dealer or a distribution intended to cater to the appe-
tite or satisfy the craving of one addicted to the use of the drug.
A "prescription" issued for either of the latter purposes pro-
tects neither the physician who issues it nor the dealer who
knowingly accepts and fills it.3
In 1938, Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.32
This Act established a class of drugs that could only be dispensed by
29. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925) (holding that Harrison Narcotic
Act is constitutional as applied to physicians and pharmacists who are registered but
unconstitutional as applied to those who merely possess the drug); United States v.
Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922) (holding that physician who prescribed over 3,000
doses of heroin, morphine, and cocaine to an addict did not act in good faith, and
therefore violated the Harrison Narcotic Act); Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254
U.S. 189, 192 (1920) ("[O]ne may take a principal part in a prohibited sale of a drug
by unlawfully issuing a prescription to the would-be purchaser."); Webb v. United
States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919) (holding the Harrison Narcotic Act constitutional as ap-
plied to pharmacists securing morphine to individuals without a physician's prescrip-
tion); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919) (upholding the constitutionality
of the Harrison Narcotic Act as a valid exercise of Congress's Article 1, § 8 taxing
power); Dunford v. United States, 216 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1954) (stating that it is well
settled that the Harrison Narcotic Act is constitutional).
30. Dunford, 216 F.2d at 184.
31. Jin Fuey Moy, 254 U.S. at 194. In Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919),
the Supreme Court stated that to call an order for the use of morphine to sustain a
person's habit a physician's prescription "would be so plain a perversion of meaning
that no discussion of the subject was required." Id. at 99-100.
32. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 65, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), amended by Act
of Oct. 26, 1951, Pub. L. No. 215, ch. 578, § 1, 65 Stat. 648 (1951) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 353(b)(1) (1988)). The Act provides:
A drug intended for use by man which -
(A) is a habit-forming drug to which section 352(d) of this title applies; or
(B) because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the
method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use, is not safe for
use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer
such drug; or
(C) is limited by an approved application under section 355 of this title to use
under the professional supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to adminis-
ter such drug, shall be dispensed only (i) upon a written prescription of a practi-
1994]
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prescription. Narcotics and barbiturates, among other things, were
included.33 Dispensing a prescription drug without a valid prescrip-
tion was "misbranding," a misdemeanor offense. 4 Since the Act
controlled dispensation, prosecutions have been limited to cases in
which there was an exchange of medication. Primarily, these prose-
cutions involved pharmacies and their employees.3 5 However, a
physician who sold pills to an undercover officer was also prose-
cuted under the Act.36
In 1965, Congress amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.37
These amendments explicitly set limits on the prescription of de-
pressant and stimulant drugs, primarily amphetamines and barbitu-
tioner licensed by law to administer such drug, or (ii) upon an oral prescription
of such practitioner which is reduced promptly to writing and filed by the phar-
macist or, (iii) by refilling any such written or oral prescription if such refilling is
authorized by the prescriber either in the original prescription or by oral order
which is reduced promptly to writing and filed by the pharmacist. The act of
dispensing a drug contrary to the provisions of this paragraph shall be deemed
to be an act which results in the drug being misbranded while held for sale.
21 U.S.C. § 503(b).
33. Drugs that contain "any quantity of narcotic or hypnotic substance" require
prescriptions. 21 U.S.C. § 352(d) (1988).
34. 21 U.S.C. §§ 333, 353(b)(1)(c)(iii) (1988) (defining violation of § 353 or § 331
as a misdemeanor offense). Section 331(k) provides in pertinent part:
The following acts and the causing thereof hereby prohibited: (k) . . . The doing
of any other act with respect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is
done while such article is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) after ship-
ment in interstate commerce and results in such article being adulterated or
misbranded.
Section 333 establishes a term of imprisonment of up to one year and/or a fine of up
to $1000 for a first violation of § 331. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) (1988). Subsequent
convictions carry a penalty of not more than three years imprisonment and/or a fine
of not more than $10,000. § 333(a)(2).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Siler Drug Store Co., 376 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1967)
(holding that owner and company can be convicted for unlawful act of employee);
Dugan Drug Stores, Inc. v. United States, 326 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1964) (upholding
conviction of pharmacy despite acquittal of employees for violation of Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act); United States v. Thomas Apothecary, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 890
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding that when co-owners and employees of corporation are
closely associated with each other and the offenses are so closely related as to show
involvement by all defendants, joinder is proper); United States v. Gilbar Pharmacy,
Inc., 221 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (determining that joinder of corporation, two
of its principals, and an employee was in the interest of justice).
36. United States v. DeFreese, 270 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act applies to both retail pharmacists and to physicians).
37. Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, § 4, 79 Stat.
226 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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rates.38 The amendments, which applied to physicians while acting
in the course of their professional practice,39 limited the dispensa-
tion and distribution of such stimulants and depressants to the "or-
dinary and authorized course" of business, profession, occupation,
or employment.4°
The standard of "professional practice" in both the Harrison Nar-
cotic Act and Drug Abuse Control Amendment remained in the
Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA)4 ' which repealed portions
of the two prior acts.42 Under the CSA, professionals are exempt
from criminal prosecution as long as their drug-related activity is
within their "professional practice."'43
The CSA established a framework for the control of the manufac-
ture, distribution, and dispensation of controlled substances. The
CSA requires individuals and companies who manufacture, handle,
prescribe, or dispense controlled substances to register with the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).' The CSA sets forth
38. Id. § 3(a), (b), 79 Stat. 226, 227-31, repealed by Controlled Substances Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 701(a), 84 Stat. 1236, 1281 (1970).
39. Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, § 3(b), 79 Stat.
226, 227-28. E.g., White v. United States, 399 F.2d 813, 816-19 (8th Cir. 1968).
The Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, § 5, amended 21 U.S.C.
§ 331(q)(2) as follows: "The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited:
.. the sale, delivery, or other disposition of a drug in violation of section 511(b) of
this title .. " This language was repealed by the Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, § 701(a), 84 Stat. 1236, 1281 (1970).
Section 3(b) of the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965 amended the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 511(b) to read: "No person, other than - (1) a person
described in subsection (a) while such person is acting in the ordinary and author-
ized course of his business, profession, occupation, or employment ... shall sell,
deliver, or otherwise dispose of any depressant or stimulant drug to any other per-
son." Among those exempted from this section were "(4) Practitioners licensed by
law to prescribe or administer depressant or stimulant drugs, while acting in the
course of their professional practice." § 3(b), 79 Stat. at 228. Both amendments
were repealed by the Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 701(a), 84
Stat. 1236, 1284 (1970).
40. Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, § 3(b), 79 Stat.
226, 229, repealed by Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 701(a), 84
Stat, 1236, 1281 (1970).
41. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, §§ 100-709, 84 Stat,
1236, 1242-84 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. § 801-904 (1988)).
42. Id. § 701(a), 84 Stat. 1236, 1281 (1970).
43. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 822(a) (1988).
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laws and regulations restricting a registrant's activities.45 There are
both criminal and civil penalties for registrants who act in violation
of these laws and regulations.46
The CSA also prohibits the illegal distribution or dispensation of
controlled substances.47 The "professional practice" exception ap-
pears in the definition section of the CSA.48 A "practitioner" is de-
fined as follows:
[A] physician, dentist, veterinarian, scientific investigator, phar-
macy, hospital, or other person licensed, registered or otherwise
permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he
practices or does research, to distribute, dispense, conduct re-
search with respect to, administer... a controlled substance in
the course of professional practice.49
Courts have held that the phrase "professional practice" is not un-
constitutionally vague50 and that the regulation which sets it forth is
valid.5' In United States v. Rosenberg, 2 the Ninth Circuit noted,
The statute does give fair notice. This language has been in the
statute books since 1914 and no one has ever had problems with
its interpretation. The language clearly means that a doctor is
not exempt from the statute when he takes actions that he does
not in good faith believe are for legitimate medical purposes.5 3
Further, the Ninth Circuit found,
The ease and consistency with which the courts have inter-
preted this language convinces us that it is not vague.... More-
over, it is difficult to see how the language can be made more
precise and at the same time ban the undesirable conduct on
the part of physicians which Congress intended to make illegal
and subject to sanctions.54
45. E.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 823, 825-829, 841 (1988).
46. Id. §§ 841-843.
47. Id. § 841(a).
48. Id. § 802(21); 21 C.F.R. § 1306.05 (1991).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 802(21) (1988).
50. United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 193 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1031 (1976); accord United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973).
51. United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062, 1069 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1031 (1975).
52. 515 F.2d 190, 193 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1976).
53. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d at 193.
54. Id. at 198 (citations omitted).
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The corresponding language that relates to pharmacists similarly
passes constitutional muster.5
II. THE REGULATORY FRAMEwoRK
The CSA established a comprehensive framework to control the
abuse of prescription drugs by limiting the misuse of those drugs and
their diversion into illegal channels. Thus, the CSA established con-
trols over the manufacture of the drugs as well as their wholesale
and retail distribution, including dispensation and prescription by
health care professionals.56
The CSA specifies that the Attorney General is responsible for
implementation.57 The Attorney General has delegated her respon-
sibilities to the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA).5 8
Individuals who violate the CSA may be subject to criminal con-
victions. 9 The registration requirement, when combined with the
Attorney General's authority to promulgate rules and regulations
under the Act, means that registrants who act outside of those rules
and regulations illegally distribute or dispense controlled sub-
stances.' The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of
the CSA and its regulations.61
A. Scheduling of Controlled Substances
The CSA established five schedules of controlled substances dif-
ferentiated on the basis of potential for abuse, currently accepted
55. United States v. Hayes, 595 F.2d 258,260 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866
(1979).
56. 21 U.S.C. §§ 823, 825-829, 841-843 (1988).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (1988). The delegation of authority to the Attorney Gen-
eral is constitutional. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991); United States v.
Dunar, 614 F.2d 39, 41 (5th Cir. 1980).
58. 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b) (1993).
59. United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207,210-11 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980).
60. Id.
61. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975); United States v. Henry, 727
F.2d 1373, 1378-79 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984)
(en banc); United States v. Hayes, 595 F.2d 258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866
(1979); United States v. Davis, 564 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1015 (1978); United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973).
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medical usage, and effects of abuse.62 The highest schedule, Sched-
ule I, is for substances that have a high potential for abuse and no
currently accepted medical use in the United States.63 Substances in
Schedule I include heroin, cocaine, and marijuana.' 4 Substances in
Schedules II through V have decreasing abuse potential and effects
from abuse, and increasingly accepted medical usage.65 Prescription
drugs and controlled substances fall into schedules II through IV.66
Examples of medications containing Schedule II controlled sub-
stances are Demerol, 67 Dilaudid,6s and Ritalin.69 Examples of
medications containing Schedule III controlled substances are Tyle-
nol with Codeine70 and Didrex.7' Examples of medications contain-
ing Schedule IV controlled substances are Darvon,72 Miltown,73 and
Valium.74 Schedule V consists of compounds, mixtures, or prepara-
tions containing limited amounts of certain narcotic drugs.75 Some
Schedule V controlled substances are contained in prescription
medications while others are contained in over-the-counter drugs.
An example of a Schedule V drug is cough syrup with Codeine, such
as Robitussin. 76 The prescribing and dispensing of medication on all
schedules is controlled by laws and regulations.77
62. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
63. Id § 812(b)(1).
64. There have been unsuccessful attempts to force the rescheduling of mari-
juana. E.g., NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing to reschedule
marijuana).
65. The fact that a substance has no currently accepted medical use does not
disqualify it from being on Schedule H. Id. at 748.
66. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
67. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2142 (47th ed. 1993).
68. Id. at 1199.
69. Id at 909.
70. Id. at 1430 (tablets).
71. Id. at 2450.
72. PrYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1290 (47th ed. 1993).
73. Id at 2500.
74. Id. at 2028.
75. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
76. E.g., Seelig, 622 F.2d at 210.
77. See infra notes 140-70 and accompanying text.
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B. Registration
The CSA established a process for registering professionals who
wish to handle controlled substances.78 Registrants can lawfully
handle controlled substances within the bounds of their professional
practice.79 Registration imposes responsibilities upon these individ-
uals beyond those of professional practice. If any of these responsi-
bilities are violated, registration can be revoked.8"
1. Obtaining a Registration
Doctors and pharmacies that dispense controlled substances must
be registered with the DEA,8 ' but individual pharmacists need not
register. Physicians who dispense and/or administer controlled sub-
stances must obtain separate registrations for each office at which
they dispense or administer regulated drugs.'n Registration is
granted to anyone authorized under state law to prescribe, dispense,
or conduct research with controlled substances, unless the DEA de-
termines that such registration is not in the public interest.8 3 The
Act requires the DEA to consider the following factors in determin-
ing the public interest:
1. The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing
board or professional disciplinary authority;
2. The applicant's experience in dispensing, or conducting re-
search with respect to controlled substances;
3. The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State
laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
controlled substances;
4. Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws re-
lating to controlled substances; and,
78. 21 U.S.C. § 823(b), (e), (f) (1988); 21 C.F.R. § 1301.21 (1993).
79. 21 U.S.C. § 823(b), (e), (f) (1988); 21 C.F.R. § 1301.21 (1993).
80. See infra notes 97-120 and accompanying text.
81. 21 U.S.C. § 822 (1988); 21 C.F.R. § 1301.21 (1993). As of the early 1980s, the
DEA registered 600,000 registrants per year at a rate of approximately 50,000 a
month. Kirk v. Mueller, 749 F.2d 297, 298 (6th Cir. 1984).
82. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.23(a)(3) (1993). See also United States v. Clinical Leasing
Serv., Inc., 925 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.) (holding that the regulation requiring a separate
registration of each principal place of business was not unconstitutionally vague),
cert. denied sub nom. Varnishung v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 188 (1991).
83. 21 U.S.C. § 823(b), (e), (f) (1988).
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5. Such other conduct which may threaten the public health
and safety.84
Under the "public interest" provision, the DEA may deny or revoke
a registration based upon any controlled substance-related misde-
meanor conviction, even if the conviction is not directly related to
the DEA registration.8 5 An applicant or registrant's failure to fully
admit any drug abuse problem may also result in a public interest
denial.8 6 In addition, falsifying statements in a registration applica-
tion is a criminal offense. 7
Practitioners may register for any or all schedules except Schedule
1.88 Registrants indicate for which schedules they seek to register as
part of their applications. Each registrant is issued a certificate stat-
ing the registrant's authorized schedules and DEA registration
number. The DEA number must be placed on all prescriptions for
controlled substances.8 9 It is illegal to use a fictitious, revoked, sus-
pended, or expired registration number; or a number issued to
someone else.90 No allegation of diversion or criminal intent is nec-
essary for indictment; all that need be alleged is that the act was
knowing or intentional.91
84. Id
85. Trawick v. DEA, 861 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1988).
86. Shatz v. United States Dep't of Justice, 873 F.2d 1089 (8th Cir. 1989);
Trawick, 861 F.2d at 77.
87. 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(4)(A) (1988). E.g., United States v. Ferguson, 776 F.2d
217 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that a failure to disclose prior surrender of DEA regis-
tration is a criminal offense), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020 (1986).
88. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.22(c) (1993). Only individuals who are conducting research
may be registered for use of Schedule I controlled substances. Id.
The filing fee for physicians who prescribe ("distribute") controlled substances is
$60 for three years; for pharmacies that dispense controlled substances, $125 per
year. The cost is the same regardless of the number of schedules involved. 21
C.F.R. § 1301.11 (1993).
Each pharmacy location must have a separate registration. A physician, however,
does not need to register each office unless he administers or dispenses controlled
substances as part of his professional practice at each office or unless he maintains
controlled substances at each. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.24(a), (b)(3) (1993).
89. 21 C.F.R. 1306.05(a) (1993). The DEA number begins with a letter repre-
senting the state in which the practitioner is registered followed by the first initial of
the physician's last name and a series of numbers that are created in such a way as to
be self-checking.
90. 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(2) (1988).
91. United States v. Carranza, 632 F. Supp. 1030, 1032-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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"Registration circumscribes the authority to dispense controlled
substances." 92 A physician who prescribes or dispenses a controlled
substance that is on a schedule for which he is not registered can be
convicted of illegal distribution of that drug.93 Courts may also im-
pose civil penalties.94
Pharmacies and practitioners stocking controlled substances must
provide "effective controls and procedures to guard against theft
and diversion." 95 The DEA has established standards for both
physical security and operating procedures, including employee
screening procedures.
96
2. Suspension of a Registration
The DEA can suspend or revoke all schedules of a registration.
97
Suspension or revocation can occur for any of the following reasons:
1. Material falsification of any application;
2. Conviction of a felony involving a controlled substance;
3. Suspension, revocation, or denial of a State license and
loss of authority to distribute or dispense controlled substances
or where such suspension, revocation, or denial has been
recommended;
4. Commission of such acts as would render registration in-
consistent with the public interest; or
5. Exclusion from the Medicare/Medicaid program. 98
92. United States v. Blanton, 730 F.2d 1425, 1430 (11th Cir. 1984).
93. Id at 1429. In Blanton, the court rejected the defendant's argument that he
could only be prosecuted under the less serious provisions in 21 U.S.C. §§ 842-843
because he had committed only a "technical" violation rather than the more serious
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) for which he was convicted. Id. at 1429-30.
94. 21 U.S.C. § 842(c)(1) (1988); United States v. Clinical Leasing Serv., Inc., 925
F.2d 120 (5th Cir.) (affirming fine imposed by lower court for dispensing controlled
substances without proper registration), cert. denied sub nom. Varnishung v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 188 (1991).
95. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.71(a) (1993).
96. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.72-1301.76, 1301.90-1301.93 (1993). The employee screen-
ing procedures include a criminal record check and inquiry into prior use of con-
trolled substances. Id. § 1301.90.
97. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a), (b) (1988); 21 C.F.R. § 1301.45(a)-(c) (1993).
98. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1988). The provision relating to suspension, revocation,
or denial based on the public interest was added to the CSA in 1984. As noted by
Representative Gilman in the debate on the amendment:
[Tihe bill amends the Controlled Substances Act to make it easier for the Drug
Enforcement Administration [DEA] to suspend or revoke the authority of phy-
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The "DEA has consistently held that termination of a registrant's
state authority to handle controlled substances requires that DEA
revoke the registrant's DEA Certificate of Registration."99
No registration can be suspended or revoked without the DEA
Administrator issuing an order to show cause and, if requested by
the registrant, holding a hearing."c° However, the Administrator
can, without prior notice, suspend any registration simultaneously
with the institution of proceedings to suspend or revoke it "where
he finds that there is an imminent danger to the public health or
safety."' ' If there is no "imminent danger," then an emergency
suspension is inappropriate. 10 2
An emergency suspension continues "until the conclusion of such
proceedings, including judicial review thereof, unless sooner with-
drawn by the Attorney General or dissolved by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction."'" 3 Judicial review of an emergency suspension is
limited to a determination of whether the agency's action was "ra-
tional, based on relevant factors, and within the agency's statutory
authority. ' '1°4
sicians ... who write or dispense prescriptions in a way that is threatening to the
public health or safety.
130 CONo. Ruc. H9681 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1984) (statement of Rep. Gilman).
99. 57 Fed. Reg. 27,790 (1992) (statement of Mark L. Fincher, M.D.).
100. The order to show cause is governed by 21 C.F.R. § 1301.48 (1993). A hear-
ing is held only upon the request of the registrant. Id. § 1301.48(d). The hearing is
governed by 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.51-1301.57 (1993).
101. 21 U.S.C. § 824(d) (1988). See also 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.45(c), 1301.46(a)
(1993). An order of immediate suspension shall contain a statement of the Adminis-
trator's findings. Id. § 1301.46(a).
102. Norman Bridge Drug Co. v. Banner, 529 F.2d 822, 828 (5th Cir. 1976). In
Norman Bridge, the court found that a six month-old conviction of the pharmacy's
owner for distributing 100 Didrex on one occasion, combined with recordkeeping
violations that had been discovered seven months previously, did not amount to an
"imminent danger." In contrast, failure to maintain required records, denial on the
part of patients that they had received controlled substances indicated in their
records, denial of dispensing of controlled substances at the office, and the ordering
of additional controlled substances after the execution of an administrative search
warrant provided a basis for the emergency suspension of a physician's registration.
In re Burka, 684 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
103. 21 U.S.C. § 824(d) (1988). See also Norman Bridge, 529 F.2d at 828.
104. Burka, 684 F. Supp. at 1305 (quoting Shane Meat Co. v. United States
Dep't of Defense, 800 F.2d 334, 336 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Frisby v. United States
Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 755 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1985))).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/4
PRESCRIPTION DRUG CONTROL
The burden of persuasion and production in a license revocation
or denial hearing rests, in the first instance, with the Administra-
tor.1" 5 Once the Administrator produces evidence supporting his
action, the registrant bears the burden of production to rebut that
evidence."° Hearsay evidence is admissible and the Administra-
tor's decision may be based on such evidence.10 7
Additionally, evidence obtained pursuant to a grant of immunity
is admissible against the person from whom it came.10 8 Expert testi-
mony is not required in the revocation process.10 9 "Because of his
expertise in matters relating to the misuse of controlled substances,
the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration would
have been free to reject expert opinion testimony and to use his own
experience to draw reasonable conclusions from the facts in evi-
dence.""' When revocation or suspension is based upon a con-
trolled substance-related felony conviction, the scope of the hearing
is limited."' The question presented is whether the registrant was
convicted "in fact or in effect" for violating a relevant law."12
The Administrator has consistently held that the controlled sub-
stance-related felony conviction upon which his action is based need
not involve the individual's registration." 3 Action can also be taken
in response to a street level controlled substance violation." 4 The
action can also be based on a plea of nolo contendere to a felony
105. Shatz v. United States Dep't of Justice, 873 F.2d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 1989).
106. Id.
107. Klinestiver v. DEA, 606 F.2d 1128, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting a claim
that 21 C.F.R. § 1316.59(a) requires a higher standard for admissibility of evidence
in a DEA hearing). However, the registrant may request that the Administrative
Law Judge subpoena an absent witness to attend the hearing. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 1316.52(d) (1993).
108. Burley v. DEA, 443 F. Supp. 619 (M.D. Tenn. 1977) (holding that informa-
tion obtained from the pharmacist under federal grant of immunity may be provided
to and used by the State Board of Pharmacy because the proceeding is civil, not
penal).
109. Noell v. Bensinger, 586 F.2d 554, 557 (5th Cir. 1978).
110. Id.
111. Id. See also Pearce v. United States Dep't of Justice, 867 F.2d 253, 255-56
(6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
112. Pearce, 867 F.2d at 256.
113. Trawick v. DEA, 861 F.2d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting 51 Fed. Reg.
17,556-57 (1986) (statement of Paul Stepak, M.D.)); Fourth Street Pharmacy v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 836 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
114. Trawick, 861 F.2d at 73.
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because such a plea represents a "conviction" within the meaning of
the statute.'15 Because the Administrator has the option of revoca-
tion or suspension, information relating to the prescribing practices
of the registrant is relevant even in light of a felony conviction.116
A misdemeanor drug conviction that is unrelated to the defend-
ant's registration may form the basis of a revocation in the public
interest." Such action may be taken even though the state licens-
ing board that reviewed the registrant's actions felt that only a pro-
bationary period was necessary.""
In denying or revoking a DEA registration, the Administrator
must include in his Order the findings of fact and conclusions of law
upon which the Order is based." 9 Decisions of the Administrator
are reviewed by the federal courts of appeal using an abuse of dis-
cretion standard. 20
C. Recordkeeping
The CSA established a system of recordkeeping to track con-
trolled substances from manufacture to wholesale distribution to the
ultimate user.1 21 Failure to abide by these recordkeeping require-
ments could subject a registrant to criminal and/or civil sanctions. 22
115. Pearce, 867 F.2d at 255; Noell, 586 F.2d at 556; Sokoloff v. Saxbe, 501 F.2d
571 (2d Cir. 1974). The possibility of revocation does not have to be disclosed dur-
ing a plea of guilty to distribution. United States v. Fitzhugh, 801 F.2d 1432, 1434-35
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Noell, 586 F.2d at 556.
116. Pearce, 867 F.2d at 256.
117. Trawick, 861 F.2d at 75. Dr. Trawick pled guilty to misdemeanor possession
of cocaine as part of a plea agreement that included dropping all felony charges
including aiding and abetting a distribution. The Administrator found that Dr.
Trawick's registration was inconsistent with the public welfare because of the misde-
meanor conviction and because his failure to fully admit his criminal involvement
and drug abuse problems caused "grave reservations about [petitioner's] rehabilita-
tion." Id. at 76 (alteration in original).
118. Id. at 74.
119. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.57 (1993).
120. See, e.g., Pearce, 867 F.2d at 256.
121. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 821-863 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 21 C.F.R.
§§ 1301-1306 (1993).
122. 21 U.S.C. § 842 (a)(5), (10) (1988) (civil); 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(4)(A) (1988)
(criminal). In United States v. Norton, 640 F. Supp. 1257 (D. Colo. 1986), the DEA
also obtained an injunction requiring Dr. Norton to comply with the recordkeeping
requirements including conducting an inventory and establishing a method by which
he was to do so.
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The recordkeeping requirements apply to pharmacy owners, even if
they are not pharmacists, and to the pharmacists at a store even if
they are not owners.123 Registered individual practitioners such as
doctors124 are not generally required to keep records, unless they
"regularly engage[ ] in the dispensing or administering of controlled
substances and charge[] patients, either separately or together with
charges for other professional services, for substances so dispensed
or administered"'" or they prescribe "in the course of maintenance
or detoxification treatment of an individual.' 12
6
The records that registrants are required to maintain under the
Act are a bi-annual inventory of controlled substances, 27 order
forms, 28 theft/loss reports, and where appropriate, prescriptions
and other evidence of dispensing. 29 The regulations require that
these records be kept for at least two years.130
Records related to Schedule II controlled substances must be kept
separate from those related to drugs in other schedules.13' This gen-
erally means that pharmacies maintain files of prescriptions for
Schedule II controlled substances separate from other prescriptions.
123. See United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 811, 814 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding
that non-pharmacist owner of pharmacy was properly charged); United States v.
Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that pharmacist who did not
own pharmacy was properly charged).
124. An "individual practitioner" is "a physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other
individual licensed, registered or otherwise permitted, by the United States or the
jurisdiction in which he practices, to dispense a controlled substance in the course of
professional practice, but does not include a pharmacist, a pharmacy, or an institu-
tional practitioner." 21 C.F.R. § 1306.02(b) (1993).
125. 21 C.F.R. § 1304.03(d) (1993) (emphasis added).
126. Id. § 1304.03(c), (d).
127. Id. § 1304.04(a). See also id. §§ 1304.11-1304.17 (outlining inventory
requirements).
128. Registrants are generally required to maintain records of controlled sub-
stances received or sold. Id. § 1304.21(a). In particular, all Form 222s must be main-
tained for two years. Id. § 1305.13(c).
129. Id. §§ 1304.04(h), 1306.15, 1306.25.
130. 21 C.F.R. § 1304.04(a) (1993).
131. See id. § 1304.04(h)(1), (2) (applying to pharmacists); id. § 1304.04(g) (ap-
plying to physicians). But see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.,
PHARMACIST'S MANUAL: AN INFORMATIONAL OUTLINE OF THE CONTROLLED SUB-
STANCES Acr OF 1970, at 15 (1990) (stating that prescriptions for Schedule II con-
trolled substances may be filed in a separate file with other prescriptions for
controlled substances) [hereinafter PHARMACIST'S MANUAL]. The non-Schedule II
prescriptions must be marked with a red "C." Id. at 17.
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In turn, records related to controlled substances must be kept sepa-
rate from other records the registrant may keep, or else stored in a
readily retrievable fashion. 32 In most pharmacies, prescriptions for
controlled substances in Schedules III and IV are marked or
stamped with a large, red "C" and filed along with the other, non-
Schedule II prescriptions filled at the pharmacy.13
3
It is a criminal offense under the Act "[t]o furnish false or fraudu-
lent material information in, or omit any material information from,
any... report, record or other document required to be made, kept,
or filed.' 131 In the prosecution of such an offense, the government
is not required to prove that the defendant was aware of the stat-
ute's recordkeeping requirements. 35
It is also a violation for registrants to:
[R]efuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, report,
notification, declaration, order or order form, statement, in-
voice, or information required .... 136
Violations of this provision are criminal if it is alleged and proven
that they were done "knowingly.' 1 37 Otherwise, violations consti-
tute a civil offense carrying only a fine.138 In the civil context, per-
sons failing to maintain the required records are strictly liable.
D. Writing and Filing Prescriptions
1. A Prescription Defined
A prescription is defined as follows:
An order for medication which is dispensed to or for an ulti-
mate user but does not include an order for medication which is
132. The term "readily retrievable" includes records that can be separated out
from all others in a reasonable time and/or records that are visually identifiable
apart from the others. 21 C.F.R. § 1304.02(h) (1993).
133. § 21 C.F.R. 1304.04(h)(2); PHARMACIST'S MANUAL, supra note 131, at 15.
The "C" must be "in red ink, not less than one inch high, in the lower right corner."
Id. at 17.
134. 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(4)(A) (1988).
135. United States v. Averi, 715 F. Supp. 1508, 1511 (M.D. Ala. 1989). However,
the DEA generally sends each registrant, at the time of registration, a booklet that
outlines the recordkeeping responsibilities under the Act. Id.
136. 21 U.S.C. § 842(a)(5) (1988).
137. 21 U.S.C. § 842(c)(2)(A) (1988).
138. 21 U.S.C. § 842(c)(1) (1988). The fine is "not more than $25,000" per viola-
tion. Id.
139. United States v. Green Drugs, 905 F.2d 694, 698 (3d Cir. 1990).
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dispensed for immediate administration to the ultimate user
(e.g., an order to dispense a drug to a bed patient for immediate
administration in a hospital is not a prescription.)140
Prescriptions for controlled substances can only be issued by indi-
vidual practitioners who are authorized to prescribe controlled sub-
stances by their local jurisdiction and either registered or exempted
from registration by the DEA.14 1 In order for a prescription for a
controlled substance to be valid, it "must be issued for a legitimate
medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual
course of his professional practice."' 42
The only specific limitation on prescribing by a physician con-
tained in the CSA or its regulations relates to the treatment of a
narcotics addict. A prescription may not be issued by an individual
practitioner for the dispensing of narcotic drugs for "detoxification
treatment" or "maintenance treatment."" However, in an emer-
gency, practitioners may write orders for the administration, but
may not prescribe, narcotic drugs to individuals under the following
conditions:
[Flor the purpose of relieving acute withdrawal symptoms when
necessary while arrangements are being made for referral for
treatment. Not more than one day's medication may be admin-
istered to the person or for the person's use at one time. Such
emergency treatment may be carried out for not more than
three days and may not be renewed or extended. 44
Additionally, narcotic drugs may be administered or dispensed, in a
hospital setting, under the following conditions:
140. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.02(f) (1993).
141. Id. § 1306.03(a)(1), (2).
142. Id. § 1306.04(a).
143. Id. § 1306.04(c). "Maintenance treatment" is "the dispensing, for a period
in excess of twenty-one days, of a narcotic drug in the treatment of an individual for
dependence upon heroin or other morphine-like drugs." 21 U S.C. § 802(29) (1988).
"Detoxification treatment" is defined as follows:
[Tihe dispensing, for a period not in excess of one hundred and eighty days, of a
narcotic drug in decreasing doses to an individual in order to alleviate adverse
physiological or psychological effects incident to withdrawal from the continu-
ous or sustained use of a narcotic drug and as a method of bringing the individ-
ual to a narcotic drug-free state within such period.
21 U.S.C. § 802(30) (1988). The operation of a maintenance treatment or detoxifica-
tion treatment program constitutes the operation of a narcotics treatment program
which requires a separate registration. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.02(i), 1301.11(f) (1993).
144. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(b) (1993).
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[T]o maintain or detoxify a person as an incidental adjunct to
medical or surgical treatment of conditions other than addic-
tion, or... to persons with intractable pain in which no relief or
cure is possible or none has been found after reasonable
efforts. 45
2. Prescription Procedures
Each prescription for a controlled substance must be dated and
signed on the date of issue.' 46 It must include the full name and
address of the patient and the name, address, and registration
number of the prescribing practitioner. 1 A prescription may be
prepared for the physician's signature but the practitioner is respon-
sible to see that the prescription conforms with the requirements. 4
A "prescription" that does not fulfill these requirements is arguably
not a prescription and therefore its writing and filling are illegal acts.
At a minimum, however, evidence of a physician's failure to follow
these requirements has been used to show that he was involved in
the illegal distribution of controlled substances. 49
While controlled substances on Schedules III, IV and V may be
prescribed orally or in writing, Schedule II controlled substances
may be dispensed only pursuant to a written prescription.150 How-
ever, in the case of an emergency, a Schedule II controlled sub-
stance may be dispensed pursuant to an oral authorization by a
prescribing practitioner as long as the quantity involved is limited to
that required during the emergency period, the pharmacist immedi-
ately reduces the oral authorization to writing, the pharmacist
knows the practitioner or makes a reasonable effort to determine
his legitimacy, and within 72 hours a written prescription is deliv-
ered to the pharmacy.' 5 ' Prescriptions for Schedule II drugs may
145. Id. § 1306.07(c).
146. Id. § 1306.05(a).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See supra note 102 for a discussion of Norman Bridge.
150. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1306.11(a) (Schedule II), 1306.21(a) (Schedules III and IV),
1306.31(a) (Schedule V) (1993).
151. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.11(d)(1)-(4) (1993). An emergency situation exists when
(a) immediate administration of the controlled substance is necessary for proper
treatment, (b) no appropriate alternative treatment is available, and (c) it is not
reasonably possible for the prescribing practitioner to provide a written prescription.
21 C.F.R. § 290.10 (1993). The words "Authorization for Emergency Dispensing"
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not be refilled; prescriptions for controlled substances in the other
schedules may be refilled up to five times in six months if the pre-
scription so provides. 152 After five refills or six months, a new pre-
scription, either oral or written, is required.'53 The refilling of an
expired prescription - one that is older than six months - or one
for which no further refills exist is unlawful.154
Certain Schedule V controlled substances do not require a pre-
scription. 55 The amount and frequency of dispensing such Schedule
V substances is controlled by regulation. 156 Dispensing Schedule V
controlled substances in violation of that regulation is an unlawful
act.
157
An individual practitioner may not write, nor a pharmacist fill, a
prescription for a Schedule II controlled substance written for "of-
fice use."' 58 An individual practitioner who wishes to obtain con-
trolled substances on Schedule II to dispense as part of his practice
must order them using a DEA Form 222.159 This form authorizes a
and the date of the oral order must be written on the prescription. Id.
§ 1306.11(d)(4).
152. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1306.12 (Schedule II), 1306.22 (Schedules III and IV) (1993).
153. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.22(a) (1993).
154. See United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir.) (indicting pharma-
cists for unauthorized refilling of prescriptions), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
Unauthorized refilling of prescriptions also violates the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (Supp. IV 1992). E.g., Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370,
371 (1st Cir. 1967); Rush v. United States, 370 F.2d 520, 521 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 943 (1967); United States v. Gilbar Pharmacy, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 160, 160
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
155. PHARMACIST'S MANUAL, supra note 131, at 8-9.
156. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.32 (1993). Dispensing of such a substance may be done
only by the pharmacist himself, the purchaser must be 18, the purchaser must be
known to the pharmacist or present identification, a bound book recording informa-
tion relating to the dispensing must be kept, and a limited amount may be dispensed
within any 48-hour period. Id.
157. Seelig, 622 F.2d at 209.
158. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(b) (1993) (providing that "[a] prescription may not be
issued in order for an individual practitioner to obtain controlled substances for sup-
plying the individual practitioner for the purpose of general dispensing to patients").
See also id. § 1307.11 (outlining distribution by dispenser to another practitioner);
PHARMACIST'S MANUAL, supra note 131, at 15 (providing that Schedule II prescrip-
tions may not be refilled and that such prescription orders must be kept in a separate
file).
159. 21 C.F.R. § 1305.03 (1993). The forms are obtained from the DEA and are
available to persons who are properly registered to handle Schedules I and II con-
trolled substances. Id. § 1305.04. The name and address of the registrant are pre-
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supplier to give the practitioner the drugs requested. A Form 222,
although generally filled by a wholesale distributor, can be filled by
a retail pharmacist.160 An individual practitioner may obtain con-
trolled substances on schedules other than Schedule II by using a
prescription form marked for "Office Use" and having it filled. 6' It
must be clear that the physician is not issuing a prescription for per-
sonal use.'62
3. Responsibilities in Writing and Filling Prescriptions
Both the individual practitioner writing a prescription for a con-
trolled substance and the pharmacist filling it have independent re-
sponsibility for ensuring that the prescription is lawful.16 3
The responsibility for the proper prescribing and dispensing of
controlled substances lies upon the prescribing physician, but a
corresponding responsibility rests with the pharmacist who fills
the prescription. An order purporting to be a prescription is-
sued not in the usual course of professional treatment or in le-
gitimate and authorized research is not a prescription within the
meaning and intent of section 309 of the Act (21 U.S.C. § 829)
and the person knowingly filling such a purported prescription,
as well as the person issuing it, shall be subject to the penalties
provided for violations of the provisions of law relating to con-
trolled substances. 164
The regulation does not require a pharmacist to practice medicine
although some effort must be made to establish the validity of a
prescription. 65
A booklet for pharmacists published by the DEA lists the follow-
ing indicia that may show that a prescription was issued illegally:
printed on the form and the drugs can only be shipped to that person. UNITED
STATES DEP'T oF JUsTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUGS OF ABUSE 7
(1988). The form consists of three copies, two of which go to the supplier and one
remains with the purchaser. 21 C.F.R. § 1305.09(a) (1993). The supplier then sends
one copy to the DEA. Id. § 1305.09(d).
160. A practitioner may obtain controlled substances from another practitioner,
using Form 222, under limited circumstances. Id. § 1307.11.
161. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.11 (1993).
162. Id. § 1306.04(b).
163. Id. § 1306.04(a).
164. Id.
165. Id. § 1306.05(a).
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(1) whether the purported prescription order contains an indi-
cation [for which it has been prescribed] other than one found
in the package insert; (2) whether the prescriber writes for an-
tagonistic drugs, such as depressants and stimulants at the same
time; and (3) whether patients appear to be returning too
frequently.1
Two commentators interpreted these recommendations as establish-
ing three steps for a pharmacist: "(1) examine the prescription for
facial validity, (2) call the prescriber, and (3) talk to the patient." 67
However, mere "verification" of the "prescription" by the issuing
physician is not enough. As the Fifth Circuit noted:
Verification by the issuing practitioner on request of the phar-
macist is evidence that the pharmacist lacks knowledge that the
prescription was issued outside the scope of professional prac-
tice. But it is not an insurance policy against a fact finder's con-
cluding that the pharmacist had the requisite knowledge despite
a purported but false verification. The pharmacist is not re-
quired to have a "corresponding responsibility" to practice
medicine. What is required of him is the responsibility not to
fill an order that purports to be a prescription but is not a pre-
scription within the meaning of this statute because he knows
that the issuing practitioner issued it outside the scope of medi-
cal practice.
The challenged regulation makes clear that this is the respon-
sibility imposed on pharmacists. Standing alone, the phrase
"corresponding responsibility" is not crystal clear, but when
read in context the regulation gives adequate notice of pro-
scribed conduct to pass muster. It is also evident that a phar-
macist can fulfill his responsibility under [21 C.F.R.] § 1306.04
without practicing medicine .... [A] pharmacist can know that
prescriptions are issued for no legitimate medical purpose with-
out his needing to know anything about medical science. 6 '
166. David B. Brushwood & Jeffrey J. Carlson, The Pharmacist's Responsibility
to Evaluate Suspicious Prescriptions, 46 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 467, 481 (1991)
(citing PHARMACIST'S MANUAL, supra note 131, at 31-32).
167. Id.
168. United States v. Hayes, 595 F.2d 258, 261 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 866 (1979).
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The responsibility imposed on pharmacists has been held constitu-
tional.169 A pharmacist always has the option not to fill a
prescription. 7 °
III. THE CRIMINAL FRAMEWORK
In keeping with the objective of the CSA to stem the diversion of
controlled substances from legitimate channels, the CSA makes it
illegal to knowingly or intentionally "distribute" or "dispense" a
controlled substance except as authorized by law. 7' In the context
of health care professionals, this applies "within the usual course of
professional practice."' 72 While at one time it was argued that all
registrants were "authorized by law," this argument was rejected by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Moore.73
In Moore, a medical doctor was convicted at trial of felony viola-
tions charging illegal distribution of methadone, a Schedule II con-
trolled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 174 Dr.
Moore asserted that he could not be prosecuted for illegal distribu-
tion under the provisions of the Act that make such distribution a
felony because he was a registrant. 75 He argued, and the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed, that he could
only be prosecuted for relatively minor violations contained in 21
U.S.C. §§ 842 and 843 relating to misdeeds by registrants. 76
The Supreme Court disagreed. In a unanimous opinion, the
Court held that registrants could be prosecuted for the serious fel-
ony violations set out in section 841(a) when their actions are
outside "the usual course of professional practice.' 77 The Supreme
Court found that "only the lawful acts of registrants are exempted.
By its terms § 841 reaches 'any person.' It does not exempt (as it
could have) 'all registrants' or 'all persons registered under this
169. United States v. Henry, 727 F.2d 1373, 1378-79 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Hayes, 595 F.2d at 260.
170. For a discussion of situations in which a pharmacist's actions have been de-
termined to be illegal, see infra notes 184-96.
171. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988).
172. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(A) (1993).
173. 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
174. Id. at 124-25.
175. Id. at 131.
176. Id. at 128-31.
177. Id. at 124.
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Act.'" 7 8 Any distribution or dispensing by a registrant that is not
within his "professional practice" is not authorized and is therefore
illegal. 179
A. The Crime
The majority of the prosecutions of registrants involve allegations
of illegal writing or filling of prescriptions. 8 ° Prosecutions also arise
from the outright sale of controlled substances by registrants, which
is often discovered when they are unable, during an audit, to ac-
count for controlled substances that have come into their posses-
sion. 81  A less common type of prosecution involves physicians
obtaining controlled substances by fraudulently writing prescrip-
tions in others' names.18
Under the CSA, the issuance of a prescription for a controlled
substance is tantamount to the dispensing or distribution of that
substance.
[A] prescription for a controlled substance cannot be regarded
as less than the constructive or attempted transfer of the sub-
stance itself, since a prescription is the written representation of
the drug and enables its possessor to claim physical custody and
control over the drug prescribed. 83
Therefore, when a prescription for a controlled substance is not is-
sued in the usual course of professional practice, the person writing
it as well as the person who knowingly fills it commits an illegal act.
Courts have identified the following situations as indicative that
the defendant practitioner is illegally issuing prescriptions for con-
trolled substances:
0 Physician sells prescriptions;184
178. Moore, 423 U.S. at 131.
179. Id. at 138-43.
180. See infra notes 183-213 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
183. United States v. Tighe, 551 F.2d 18, 20 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 823
(1977).
184. See United States v. Johnson, 831 F.2d 124, 126 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied
sub nom. Taylor v. United States, 485 U.S. 968 (1988); United States v. Jamieson,
806 F.2d 949, 951 (10th Cir. 1986) (exchanging prescriptions for sex); United States
v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1154, 1155 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1036 (1987);
United States v. Larson, 722 F.2d 139, 141 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 907
(1984) (exchanging prescriptions for camera equipment); United States v. Andrew,
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* Physician charges for an office visit based on the amount of
controlled substances prescribed or charges an exorbitant
amount;18
5
* Prescriptions are issued without any prior physical examina-
tion of the alleged patient, 86 or issued after an inadequate
examination;18
7
666 F.2d 915, 917 (5th Cir. 1982) (exchanging prescriptions for cash); United States
v. Thompson, 624 F.2d 740, 741 (5th Cir. 1980) (exchanging prescriptions for cash to
doctor and receptionist); United States v. Kirk, 598 F.2d 773,779 (6th Cir.) (charging
patient only if prescription written), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1978); United States
v. Rosen, 582 F.2d 1032, 1034 n.7 (5th Cir. 1978) (exchanging prescriptions for cash);
United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062, 1064-66 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v. Stewart, 443 F.2d 1129, 1130 (10th Cir. 1971)
(same).
185. See Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 192 (1920) (selling or
giving away drugs); United States v. Word, 806 F.2d 658, 660, 664 (6th Cir. 1986)
(charging $200 to $1,000 per prescription), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987); United
States v. Hoffner, 777 F.2d 1423, 1425 (10th Cir. 1985) (billing $30 for regular office
visit, $100 for controlled substances visit); United States v. Stump, 735 F.2d 273, 276
(7th Cir.) (exchanging prescriptions for excessive money or for goods or services),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 864 (1984); United States v. Andrew, 666 F.2d 915, 917 (5th
Cir. 1982) (charging $250 per prescription); United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385,
387 (9th Cir. 1974) (charging flat cash rate per prescription); United States v. Moore,
505 F.2d 426, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (charging $15 for 50 pills, $25 for 75 pills, $35 for
100 pills, $50 for 150 pills), rev'd on other grounds, 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
186. Jin Fuey Moy, 254 U.S. at 193 (citing failure of physician to give physical
examination); United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 620 (9th Cir. 1990) (same).
Accord Word, 806 F.2d at 663-64; United States v. Schuster, 777 F.2d 264, 271 (5th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 778 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1985); Larson, 722 F.2d at
142; Andrew, 666 F.2d at 917; United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1308 (5th Cir.
Unit B Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); United States v. Potter, 616 F.2d
384, 386 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 832 (1980); United States v. Dunbar, 614
F.2d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rogers, 609 F.2d 834, 838 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Smurthwaite, 590 F.2d 889, 890 (10th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Roya, 574 F.2d 386,389 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 857 (1978); United
States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181, 182 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rosenberg,
515 F.2d 190, 192 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v.
Green, 511 F.2d 1062, 1066 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United
States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296,297 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Jobe, 487 F.2d 268,
269 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 955 (1974); United States v. Bartee, 479
F.2d 484, 485 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972); White v. United States, 399 F.2d 813, 816 (8th Cir.
1968); Brown v. United States, 250 F.2d 745, 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
938, reh'g denied, 357 U.S. 933 (1958); Dunford v. United States, 216 F.2d 184, 184
(4th Cir. 1954); United States v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 769 (1947); United States v. Krasnoff, 480 F. Supp. 723, 728
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Dallman, 32 MJ. 624, 627 (A.C.M.R. 1991).
187. Jin Fuey Moy, 254 U.S. at 193 (citing failure of physician to perform ade-
quate physical examination); accord Johnson, 831 F.2d at 126; United States v. Chin,
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* Physician prescribes a particular controlled substance that
the patient either named or described;' 88
a Physician writes a prescription in a fictitious name or in a
name other than that of the patient who was present at the
time;189
795 F.2d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207, 1208 (5th
Cir. 1986); Stump, 735 F.2d at 276; United States v. Betancourt, 734 F.2d 750, 751
(11th Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Albert, 675 F.2d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 1982)
(examining only blood pressure and weight); United States v. Varma, 691 F.2d 460,
462-63 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing failure of physician to perform adequate physical ex-
amination); Outler, 659 F.2d at 1308 (same); United States v. Guerrero, 650 F.2d
728, 739 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (examining only weight and pulse); United
States v. Kirk, 584 F.2d 773, 783 (6th Cir. 1978) (examining only weight and blood
pressure); United States v. Boettjer, 569 F.2d 1078, 1079 (9th Cir.) (citing failure of
physician to perform adequate physical examination), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976
(1978); Rosen, 582 F.2d at 1035 (examining only blood pressure and weight); United
States v. Hooker, 541 F.2d 300, 305 (1st Cir. 1976) (citing failure of physician to
perform adequate physical examination); Green, 511 F.2d at 1065 (same); United
States v. Hipsch, 34 F. Supp. 270, 272 (W.D. Mo. 1940). See also United States v.
Zwick, 413 F. Supp. 113, 115-16 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (setting standards of treatment for
patients suffering from obesity).
As one court observed when discussing this point:
[N]o medical history of the patient was taken. Specifically, the patient was not
asked whether he was allergic to any type of drugs, whether he had a heart
condition or any other ailments which might affect him, anything in particular
about his general health or previous illnesses or illnesses from which he might
be suffering at the time of the visit, his employment, etc .... On a patient's
subsequent visit no history was taken, no questions were asked as to whether
there were any ill effects from taking pills, and the only conversation between
the patient and the doctor was a comment as to whether weight was gained or
lost, and what type of drug would be prescribed.
Rosen, 582 F.2d at 1034 n.7.
188. Johnson, 831 F.2d at 126 (prescribing drugs that a patient wanted); accord
Chin, 795 F.2d at 501; Norris, 780 F.2d at 1208; Varma, 691 F.2d at 462; United
States v. Voorhies, 663 F.2d 30, 34 (6th Cir. 1981); Guerrero, 650 F.2d at 739-40 app.;
United States v. Thompson, 624 F.2d 740,741 (5th Cir. 1980); Potter, 616 F.2d at 386;
Rogers, 609 F.2d at 835; Smurthwaite, 590 F.2d at 890; Roya, 574 F.2d at 389;
Boettjer, 569 F.2d at 1079; Rosenberg, 515 F.2d at 192; Green, 511 F.2d at 1066;
Bartee, 479 F.2d at 485-86; White, 399 F.2d at 815-16; Hipsch, 34 F. Supp. at 272. See
also Kirk, 584 F.2d at 783 (giving the patient a choice of drugs); Moore, 505 F.2d at
428 (allowing patient to also choose drug quantity).
189. Jin Fuey Moy, 254 U.S. at 193 (prescribing drugs for a person not present);
Word, 806 F.2d at 662 (prescribing drugs knowingly for persons under false names);
Chin, 795 F.2d at 501 (prescribing drugs for a spouse not present); Stump, 735 F.2d
at 276 (prescribing drugs knowingly to fictitious persons); Larson, 722 F.2d at 141-42
(prescribing drugs knowingly to persons under false names); Andrew, 666 F.2d at
917 (prescribing drugs for a person not present); United States v. Harrison, 651 F.2d
353, 355 (5th Cir. July 1981) (en banc) (prescribing drugs knowingly for persons
under false names); Guerrero, 650 F.2d at 732 (same); United States v. Thompson,
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* Physician was aware that the drugs were not to be used for
therapeutic or medical purposes at the time the prescription
was written;190
* Physician writes an inordinate number of prescriptions for
controlled substances overall or to individual patients or
both;1
91
* Physician is writing prescriptions too frequently; that is, the
medication as prescribed should not have run out at the time a
second prescription was written; 19
624 F.2d 740, 741 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Potter, 616 F.2d at 386 (same); Smurth-
waite, 590 F.2d at 890 (prescribing drugs for a spouse not present); Kirk, 584 F.2d at
778 (prescribing drugs knowingly for persons under false names); Roya, 574 F.2d at
389 (prescribing drugs for a boyfriend not present); United States v. Greenfield, 574
F.2d 305, 308 (5th Cir.) (prescribing drugs knowingly to persons under false names),
cerL denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); Green, 511 F.2d at 1065, 1066 (prescribing drugs to
same patients under different names); White, 399 F.2d at 816 (prescribing drugs for
persons not present); Jamieson, 605 F. Supp. at 119, 124 (prescribing drugs for same
patients under different names).
190. Word, 806 F.2d at 663-64 (prescribing drugs for resale); Chin, 795 F.2d at
501 (prescribing drugs for partying and staying up while driving); Voorhies, 663 F.2d
at 34 (prescribing drugs for partying); Outler, 659 F.2d at 1308 (prescribing drugs for
partying and resale); Guerrero, 650 F.2d at 732 (prescribing drugs for resale); Dun-
bar, 614 F.2d at 42 (same); United States v. Millen, 594 F.2d 1085, 1086 (6th Cir.)
(prescribing drugs for patient's addiction), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979); Smurth-
waite, 590 F.2d at 890 (prescribing drugs for partying); Rosen, 582 F.2d at 1036 (pre-
scribing drugs to a patient known to be delivering the drugs to others); Roya, 574
F.2d at 389 (same); Hooker, 541 F.2d at 302, 304-05 (prescribing drugs for recrea-
tional use); Rosenberg, 515 F.2d at 192 (same); Green, 511 F.2d at 1066 (same);
Badia, 490 F.2d at 297-98 (prescribing drugs for resale); Bartee, 479 F.2d at 489
(same); United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir.) (prescribing drugs for
recreational use), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972).
191. Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 98 (1919) (dispensing 4000 prescrip-
tions); United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 1990) (issuing 19 pre-
scriptions to one patient and 21 prescriptions to another patient in 1 month); Shatz
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 873 F.2d 1089, 1090 (8th Cir. 1989) (ordering 20
ounces of cocaine for "office use"); Betancourt, 734 F.2d at 754 (prescribing 45 tab-
lets of methaqualone during 99.64% of his 6,745 patient visits); United States v.
Blanton, 730 F.2d 1425, 1431 (11th Cir. 1984) (dispensing 300,000 methaqualone tab-
lets in 18 months); Potter, 616 F.2d at 386 (prescribing excessive amounts to one
individual); Kirk, 584 F.2d at 778 (issuing an unusually large quantity of prescrip-
tions); Larson, 507 F.2d at 387 (prescribing excessive amounts to one individual);
United States v. Abdallah, 149 F.2d 219,221 (2d Cir.) (issuing 12 morphine prescrip-
tions in 20 days), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 724 (1945); Melanson v. United States, 256 F.
783, 785 (5th Cir. 1919) (prescribing excessive amounts of drugs).
192. See Stump, 735 F.2d at 276 (writing multiple prescriptions to the same per-
sons during a short period of time); Smurthwaite, 590 F.2d at 890 (prescribing a
different controlled substance before prior prescription of another substance ran
out); Noell v. Bensinger, 586 F.2d 554,558 (5th Cir. 1978) (concluding it is permissi-
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- The prescriptions written show a failure to individualize
treatment or are not appropriate for the claimed illnesses;193
* Physician lacks records related to the prescriptions in ques-
tion1 94 or those records are false;
1 95
* Physician sends the patients to one particular pharmacy,
recommends a particular pharmacy, or directs them to different
pharmacies in an effort to spread the prescriptions around.196
When a physician and a pharmacist have been charged together
with illegal distribution, courts have identified the following evi-
dence to support those charges:
e Physician gave discount coupons for the pharmacy;197
ble to infer that drugs are misused if frequently prescribed in large volumes to same
individuals); Kirk, 584 F.2d at 778 (prescribing drugs three or four times a week to
the same patient); Roya, 574 F.2d at 389 (issuing a second prescription within three
days of a previous prescription for a month's supply); United States v. Greenfield,
554 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977) (prescribing drugs before prior prescription ran out);
United States v. Ellzey, 527 F.2d 1306, 1307 (6th Cir. 1976) (writing each person a
monthly prescription at each office); Green, 511 F.2d at 1065 (prescribing multiple
prescriptions); Moore, 505 F.2d at 447 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (prescribing the
same drug on the same day during two different visits); Bartee, 479 F.2d at 485 (issu-
ing post-dated prescriptions); Brown v. United States, 250 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.) (selling
3000 tablets to 2 persons), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958). See also United States
v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1946) (prescribing drugs twice a day or
two days in a row); Abdallah, 149 F.2d at 221 (prescribing 12 prescriptions within 20
days to the same person).
193. Dunbar, 614 F.2d at 42. See Zwick, 413 F. Supp. at 115-16.
194. United States v. Larson, 722 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1983) (failing to pro-
duce records indicates lack of compliance with customary medical practice), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 907 (1984); United States v. Bridwell, 583 F.2d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir.
1978) (same); see Blanton, 730 F.2d at 1431 (holding that though physician was not
required to keep records, the jury was free to infer that no legitimate researcher
would fail to record the results of his experiments).
195. Shatz, 873 F.2d at 1091 (upholding suspension of license for egregious con-
duct including keeping false records); Chin, 795 F.2d at 501 (establishing evidence of
false recordkeeping); Guerrero, 650 F.2d at 732 (same); Smurthwaite, 590 F.2d at 891
(same); Abdallah, 149 F.2d at 222 (upholding inference of bad faith because of dis-
crepancies in prescription records).
196. Jin Fuey Moy, 254 U.S. at 193 (sending patients to one particular drug-
store); Hoffner, 777 F.2d at 1425 (instructing patients to go to different pharmacies
when filling their prescriptions to avoid suspicion); Stump, 735 F.2d at 276 (same);
Andrew, 666 F.2d at 917 (recommending a pharmacy to fill prescriptions); Potter,
616 F.2d at 386 n.5 (instructing patients to go to different pharmacies when filling
their prescriptions to avoid suspicion); accord Rosen, 582 F.2d at 1036; Larson, 507
F.2d at 387-88; Bartee, 479 F.2d at 486, 489; Abdallah, 149 F.2d at 221.
197. United States v. Coward, 669 F.2d 180, 182 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
946 (1982).
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* Direct telephone lines linked the doctor's office and the
pharmacy;19
8
* Physician and pharmacy were located on the same
premises;
199
* Physician provided pharmacy with pre-signed prescription
pads to facilitate prescription-by-telephone services;20
• Physician's patients were not from the local area;
20
* The volume of prescriptions issued by the physician for con-
trolled substances was exceptional.2 1
In cases in which pharmacists have been prosecuted, courts have
cited the following evidence as proving the knowing filling of illegal
prescriptions:
* Pharmacy handled an exorbitant amount of a particular con-
trolled substance;2 3
* Controlled substances in question were dispensed pursuant
to the prescriptions of one physician;"°4
198. Id.; United States v. Ellison, 557 F.2d 128, 134-35 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 965 (1977); Green, 511 F.2d at 1065.
199. See United States v. Hammond, 781 F.2d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1986) (doc-
tor's office next door to pharmacy); Green, 511 F.2d at 1065 (doctor's office across
the hall from pharmacy); Melanson, 256 F.2d at 787 (doctor in room behind
pharmacy).
200. Coward, 669 F.2d at 182.
201. Hammond, 781 F.2d at 1537 (serving clientele of which 90% resided outside
the county).
202. Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 96 (1919) (filling 4000 prescriptions for
morphine in 11 months); Hammond, 781 F.2d at 1538 (purchasing 82.3% of a drug
in the sales territory for distribution in a town of 1200 people).
203. Webb, 249 U.S. at 99 (ordering 30 times as much morphine as the average
pharmacy in the area); United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135, 1143 (6th Cir. 1990)
(distributing Tylenol 3 to 90% of the patients from the clinic); Roth, 777 F.2d at 1201
(selling 20% of the Talwin in the State of Illinois); Hammond, 781 F.2d at 1538
(purchasing 82.3% of drug in a sales territory for distribution in a town of 1200
people); United States v. Lartey, 716 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding over 1
million tablets missing from defendant's pharmacies); United States v. Irwin, 661
F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981) (finding pharmacy's sale of drug decreased from 1400
tablets to 180 tablets during period of investigation), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 907
(1982); Green, 511 F.2d at 1071 (buying 1 million Ritalin tablets for resale in 11
months). See also United States v. August, 984 F.2d 705,713 (6th Cir. 1992) (involv-
ing a podiatrist whose drug orders were double that of an average U.S. pharmacy,
were 55 times larger than an average physician's purchase, were 4 times as great as
the orders of an average U.S. hospital, and constituted 99% of all the drug sold to
podiatrists in Michigan over 3 years).
204. Hughes, 895 F.2d at 1143 (citing high volume and percentage of prescrip-
tions for '1lenol with Codeine from one clinic); United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d
1477, 1488 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing amounts of pain medications and weight loss medi-
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* Prescriptions for multiple people were brought in by one
person;2
5
* Customers were not from the local area;
20 6
* Pharmacists had prior notice of possible illegality on the
part of the prescribing physician and/or patient;
2°7
* Pharmacist charged more than the market rate for the con-
trolled substance prescribed;
20 8
* Prescriptions were not written in the proper form;20 9
• Lack of other medication appropriate to the alleged condi-
tion in conjunction with the controlled substance prescription
or antagonistic medications written; 0
* Frequency of prescriptions for individual patients, i.e., the
patient received more medication than would have been neces-
cations disproportionately prescribed by one clinic); Hammond, 781 F.2d at 1538
(citing pharmacy as a pipeline for one doctor's prescriptions); Lartey, 716 F.2d at
955, 958 (noting that 95% of the prescriptions were written by one doctor); Lawson,
682 F.2d at 482 (citing large number of prescriptions all written by one doctor and all
presented by one person); Hayes, 595 F.2d at 261 (citing tremendous number of
prescriptions filled for one doctor); Melanson, 256 F. at 787 (same). See also PHAR-
MACIST'S MANUAL, supra note 131, at 36 (instructing pharmacists that a doctor who
writes significantly more prescription orders than other doctors may be writing ille-
gal or fraudulent prescription orders).
205. United States v. Cooper, 868 F.2d 1505, 1512 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1094 (1989); United States v. Henry, 727 F.2d 1373, 1374 n.1 (5th Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Lawson, 682 F.2d at 482. See
also PHARMACIST'S MANUAL, supra note 131, at 36 (instructing pharmacists to be
suspicious of patients presenting prescriptions written for other people).
206. Hammond, 781 F.2d at 1537 (finding 90% of Didrex prescriptions written
by one doctor were for residents outside the county); Lawson, 682 F.2d at 481-82
(involving a doctor in Philadelphia and a pharmacy in Ocean City, Maryland). See
also PHARMACIST'S MANUAL, supra note 131, at 36 (instructing pharmacists to be
suspicious of prescriptions written from outside the community).
207. Henry, 727 F.2d at 1374. See Lawson, 682 F.2d at 481,483; United States v.
Barbacoff, 416 F. Supp. 606, 609 (D.D.C. 1976); United States v. Williams, 416 F.
Supp. 611, 614 (D.D.C. 1976).
208. Cooper, 868 F.2d at 1512 (charging $13 to $15 for each pill); United States
v. Irwin, 661 F.2d at 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981) (increasing price from $18 to
$30-$40 per prescription), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 907 (1982); Hayes, 595 F.2d at 261
(charging unusually high prices).
209. Irwin, 661 F.2d at 1066.
210. United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1487 (6th Cir. 1986); PHARMACIST'S
MANUAL, supra note 131, at 35 (warning pharmacists about prescriptions for antago-
nistic drugs).
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sary if the pills were taken according to instructions or accepted
dosage levels; 1 '
High percentage of the controlled substances purchased by
the pharmacy were unaccounted for. 12
The government must also show that the drug involved is a con-
trolled substance.213
Registrants who obtain controlled substances to dispense, such as
pharmacists and some physicians, have been prosecuted when an
audit of those controlled substances shows a substantial shortage.214
In such a case, the total amount of controlled substances ordered, as
evidenced by DEA Form 222, prescriptions, or other order forms, is
compared to the amount of controlled substances dispensed as evi-
denced by filled prescriptions, office records of administration, and
the stock on hand. If the discrepancy is large enough, the govern-
ment can bring a prosecution and assert an inference that since the
pharmacist or physician had been in possession of a large quantity of
controlled substances that cannot be accounted for, the controlled
substances must have been distributed.215 However, such an infer-
ence is only permissible if there is a showing of exclusive possession
on the part of the pharmacist or physician, or credible evidence that
others with access did not take the drugs.216
Finally, physicians who write prescriptions in others' names and
fill them in order to obtain drugs for themselves commit the crime
of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud.217 A charge of illegal
distribution against a pharmacist in these circumstances, under the
211. Irwin, 661 F.2d at 1069 (filling more than double the medically acceptable
amount of Preludin in a three-month period); Hayes, 595 F.2d at 261 (filling 34 pre-
scriptions for Dilaudid and 75 prescriptions for Percodan in 1 month for a single
patient).
212. United States v. Roth, 777 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (7th Cir. 1985) (accounting
for a few hundred out of 664,000); Lartey, 716 F.2d at 958 (accounting for 20% of
tablets received); United States v. Schiffinan, 572 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir. 1978)
(accounting for 10% of tablets received); Barbacoff, 416 F. Supp. at 608 (failing tO
inventory drugs).
213. United States v. Carroll, 518 F,2d 187, 188 (6th Cir. 1975).
214. United States v. Bycer, 593 F.2d 549, 550-51 (3d Cir. 1979) (failing to ac-
count for 100,000 tablets and 400 grams of cocaine).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3). See Shatz, 873 F.2d at 1090 (charging doctor whose
records indicated patients received cocaine but where patients disclaimed receipt of
cocaine).
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theory that the physician caused the pharmacist to illegally dis-
tribute the drugs, has been rejected by one district court.21
B. Obtaining Documentary Evidence
Documentary evidence in the prosecution of a registrant gener-
ally consists of prescriptions, patient files, and related office files
such as appointment books and receipt books. This evidence is usu-
ally obtained in one of three ways: administrative search,219 crimi-
nal search warrant,22 ° or grand jury subpoena.22'
1. Administrative Search
The CSA provides for administrative inspections of "controlled
premises." '222 A "controlled premise" is one where required records
are kept or where a registrant holds, manufactures, distributes, or
dispenses controlled substances. A pharmacy is a controlled prem-
ise, as is the office of a physician who dispenses controlled sub-
stances.223 The office of a doctor who merely prescribes controlled
substances is not a controlled premise.224
The DEA has the authority to conduct administrative searches of
a controlled premise either by consent of the owner or through the
use of a warrant.' Such a search can be the source of evidence
later used in a criminal prosecution as long as the administrative
search occurred prior to the formal decision by the DEA to institute
criminal proceedings.226
Upon a statement of purpose, presentation of credentials and
written notice, and consent of the owner, a DEA Compliance Inves-
tigator has the right to enter a controlled premise and conduct an
inspection that includes copying and verifying required documents,
inspecting equipment, and taking inventory of controlled sub-
218. United States v. Kast, No. 92-0043, slip op. at 7-12 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1992).
219. See infra notes 222-46 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 247-73.
221. See infra notes 274-94 and accompanying text.
222. 21 U.S.C. § 880 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.01-1316.13
(1993).
223. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.02(b), (d) (1993).
224. 21 U.S.C. § 880(a) (1984); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.02(c) (1993).
225. See infra notes 227-35 and accompanying text.
226. See infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
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stances.2 27 If a request for entry to conduct an inspection is denied,
an inspection warrant is required before an inspection may be con-
ducted unless there is an imminent danger to the public health or
some other emergency.' 8
An administrative inspection warrant may be issued by a federal
judge or magistrate judge upon an affidavit establishing grounds.229
The applicant for an inspection warrant must establish "probable
cause" under the statute.23 0 This statutory probable cause is defined
as:
[A] valid public interest in the effective enforcement of this
subchapter or regulations thereunder sufficient to justify ad-
ministrative inspections of the area, premises, building, or con-
227. 21 U.S.C. § 880(b) (1984 & Supp. 1992); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.08 (1993). See
generally United States v. Enserro, 401 F. Supp. 460,462 (W.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding
that a consent-based search is illegal if in response to a threat of criminal prosecu-
tion); United States v. Anile, 352 F. Supp. 14 (N.D. W. Va. 1973) (holding that con-
sent without meaningful choice was not valid consent).
The regulations state that whenever possible such consent should be in writing
and shall acknowledge that the person consenting was informed (1) of his constitu-
tional right not to have an inspection without an administrative warrant, (2) of his
right to refuse consent, (3) that anything incriminating that is found may be seized
and used against him in a criminal prosecution, (4) that he has been presented with a
notice of inspection, and (5) that the consent is voluntary. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.08(b)
(1993).
228. 21 U.S.C. § 880(c) (1984). This section provides that no inspection warrant
is required under the following circumstances:
(1) consent;
(2) imminent danger to health or safety;
(3) inspection of conveyances where mobility makes it impracticable to obtain
a warrant;
(4) in any other exceptions or emergency circumstance where time or opportu-
nity to apply for a warrant is lacking; or
(5) in any other situation where a warrant is not constitutionally required.
Subsection (5) does not generally eliminate the need for an administrative inspec-
tion warrant even though the pharmaceutical industry is closely regulated. Enserro,
401 F. Supp. at 463; United States v. Montrom, 345 F. Supp. 1337, 1340 n.1 (E.D. Pa.
1972), affd, 480 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1973).
229. 21 U.S.C. § 880(d)(1), (2) (1984); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.09 (1993). According to
the regulation, the application for an administrative inspection warrant shall contain:
(1) the name and address of the controlled premises to be inspected; (2) a statement
of statutory authority and the fact that the inspection is designed to insure compli-
ance with the Act; (3) a statement relating to the nature and extent of the adminis-
trative inspection; and (4) a statement that the premises were never inspected or
when last inspected. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.09 (1993).
230. 21 U.S.C. § 880 (1984); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.10 (1993).
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veyance, or contents thereof, in the circumstances specified in
the application for the warrant133
Statutory probable cause" is established upon an averment that a
premises has never been inspected,' 3 a substantial period of time
has elapsed since the last inspection, 1 4 or that the registrant has
recently received an inordinately large supply of a controlled
substance.235
The DEA can identify registrants who are ordering large supplies
of controlled substances through a system for monitoring controlled
substance traffic called ARCOS (Automation of Reports and Con-
solidated Orders System). 36 ARCOS computerizes Schedule II
controlled substance orders at the retail level. It is based on, among
other things, the Form 222 order forms submitted by registrants to
obtain controlled substances for distribution to the public 37 The
ARCOS unit "identifies those physicians and other medical practi-
tioners [and pharmacies] who have purchased large quantities of
controlled substances through the issuance of Excessive Purchase
231. 21 U.S.C. § 880(d)(1) (1984).
232. This probable cause standard is constitutional. United States v. Schiffman,
572 F.2d 1137, 1141-43 (5th Cir. 1978); Montrom, 345 F. Supp. at 1342.
233. United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Voorhies, 663 F.2d 30, 33 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 929 (1982); United
States v. Prendergast, 585 F.2d 69, 70 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Goldfine, 538
F.2d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1976); Burka, 684 F. Supp. at 1304; United States v. Green-
berg, 334 F. Supp. 364, 367 (W.D. Pa. 1971). See also United States v. Acklen, 690
F.2d 70, 71 (6th Cir. 1982) (approving a warrant that averred the absence of a prior
inspection); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.09(4)(i) (1993).
234. United States v. Osborne, 512 F. Supp. 413,414-15 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (hold-
ing that "inspected previously ... approximately three years ago" is sufficient to
establish probable cause), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981); United States v. Pren-
dergast, 436 F. Supp. 931, 932 (W.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 585 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1978);
Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. at 367. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.09(b)(4)(ii) (1993) requires that the
date when the premises was last inspected be included in the affidavit.
235. Nechy, 827 F.2d at 1165 (holding that purchase of "suspicious quantities"
provided probable cause); Schiffman, 572 F.2d at 1140-41 (noting that large
purchases of controlled drugs by a registered retail pharmacy alone create a valid
public interest supporting inspection); Burka, 684 F. Supp. at 1303-04 (holding that
"excessive purchases" of Dilaudid provided probable cause); Montrom, 345 F. Supp.
at 1342 ("mammoth purchases"); Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. at 367 ("extraordinary
quantities").
236. 21 C.F.R. § 1304.04 (1993).
237. United States v. Blanton, 730 F.2d 1425, 1427 n.1 (11th Cir. 1984).
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Reports. '' 2 8 Instances of apparent excessive ordering are generally
referred for further investigation.
The administrative inspection warrant can authorize the inspec-
tion, copying, and/or seizure of records.2 9 The warrant must be ex-
ecuted and returned within ten days of the date of its issuance unless
additional time is granted by the judge or magistrate judge who is-
sued the warrant upon a showing of need by the government.24
An administrative inspection may be conducted even though
there is suspicion that criminal activity has occurred.241 The phar-
maceutical industry is a pervasively regulated one. Consequently,
pharmacists and distributors subject to the CSA have a reduced ex-
pectation of privacy in the records they keep in compliance with the
Act, and the "administrative search" exception to the Fourth
Amendment applies.242 Therefore, the motive of the searcher is
generally irrelevant. As long as the administrative inspection war-
rant is issued on statutory probable cause and the scope and manner
of the search conform with the statute, the administrative search is
appropriate.243 However, once it has been decided to proceed with
238. Burka, 684 F. Supp. at 1302. See also United States v. August, 984 F.2d 705,
708 (6th Cir. 1992). ARCOS reports are limited to drug purchases and do not pro-
vide information on prescribing other than through its impact on the purchases
made by pharmacies at which the prescriptions are filled. 21 C.F.R. § 1304.04
(1993).
ARCOS develops its excess purchaser reports by comparing a registrant's
purchases of a particular drug against the average purchases of that drug within the
registrant's state. Id. ARCOS reports those registrants who purchase amounts
greater than one or two standard deviations above the state's average. Id.
239. 21 U.S.C. § 880(d)(1) (1988). See United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161,
1165-66 (7th Cir. 1987).
240. 21 U.S.C. § 880(d)(3) (1988). The inspection shall begin as soon as practica-
ble after the issuance of the warrant and shall be completed promptly. 21 C.F.R.
§ 1316.11 (1993).
241. Nechy, 827 F.2d at 1161 (validating administrative search although an ulte-
rior motive was to obtain evidence of criminal activity); United States v. Acklen, 690
F.2d 70, 71 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding evidence seized during administrative search
admissible); United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1976) (refusing to
exempt a pharmacy from search because a possible violation is expected).
242. Acklen, 690 F.2d at 75.
243. Id at 74; Nechy, 827 F.2d at 1165; United States v. Prendergast, 585 F.2d 69,
70-71 (3d Cir. 1978); Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 818-19 (9th Cir. 1976). The use of
uniformed police officers to accompany and assist DEA Compliance Investigators in
the execution of an administrative inspection warrant may violate 21 U.S.C.
§ 880(b)(2), but is not a justification for suppressing the results of a search. Nechy,
827 F.2d at 1165.
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a criminal prosecution, administrative warrants may no longer be
available.244
Refusal of entry to inspectors armed with an inspection warrant is
a criminal violation.245 The regulations provide that individuals who
refuse entry to an inspector upon a warrant shall be advised of this
provision; if they persist in their refusal, they may be arrested, after
which the search will commence.2a4
2. Criminal Search Warrant
Records may also be obtained from a registrant through a crimi-
nal search warrant.a47 Search warrants are generally used to obtain
records from a physician's office since most such offices are not
"controlled premises" that can be administratively inspected2 48
From a law enforcement perspective, search warrants have an ad-
vantage over administrative inspection warrants because they allow
the search and seizure of all criminally-related evidence, not just
records required under the CSA. Thus, while financial records can-
244. United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158, 165 (D. Md. 1980). See also
United States v. Acklen, 690 F.2d 70, 72-75 (6th Cir. 1982). In Acklen, there were
three administrative searches. The second search occurred after the DEA Compli-
ance Investigator recommended to his superiors that a criminal prosecution be insti-
tuted. The third search occurred after the DEA referred the case to the United
States Attorney's Office for prosecution. The trial court suppressed all evidence
seized during the second and third searches. The government appealed only the
suppression of the fruits of the second search. The Sixth Circuit reversed the deci-
sion of the trial court to suppress the second administrative search but indicated that
its decision might be different had the third search been appealed. But see United
States v. Gel Spice Co., 773 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1985) (allowing the FDA to continue to
conduct civil inspections even after decision to proceed criminally has been made).
245. 21 U.S.C. § 842(a)(6) (1984); United States v. Enserro, 401 F. Supp. 460
(W.D.N.Y. 1975).
246. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.12 (1993).
247. E.g., United States v. August, 984 F.2d 705,709 (6th Cir. 1992) (pharmacy);
United States v. Borromeo, 954 F.2d 245 (4th Cir.) (doctor's office), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 3012 (1992); United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 623 (9th Cir. 1990) (mail
fraud investigation); United States v. Word, 806 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1986) (doctor's
office), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987); United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348 (9th
Cir. 1986) (doctor's office), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987); United States v. Out-
ler, 659 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981) (medical records), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 950 (1982); United States v. Kershman, 555 F.2d 198,201 (8th Cir.) (pharmacy),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977); United States v. Krasnoff, 480 F. Supp. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (health facility).
248. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of "con-
trolled premises."
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not be reviewed during an administrative inspection,249 they can be
reviewed during the execution of a criminal search warrant.2 0
As in the case of administrative search warrants, probable cause
must be demonstrated.251 However, traditional probable cause
under the Fourth Amendment is required for a criminal search war-
rant. The search warrant affidavit has to establish the probability
that a crime is being or has been committed and that specific, identi-
fied evidence of that crime is probably located at the premises to be
searched. 52
In the case of a search of a physician's office, probable cause must
be shown that illegal distribution of controlled substances is or has
been occurring and that records which are evidence of the illegal
distribution exist and are currently present in the doctor's office.
Generally, in seeking to establish probable cause that illegal distri-
bution has occurred, the affidavit in support of the search warrant
sets forth the facts of the investigation showing that the targeted
physician is not issuing prescriptions or dispensing controlled sub-
stances in the usual course of medical practice for a legitimate medi-
cal need. This investigation often consists of having undercover
police officers visit the target physician as patients or interviewing
selected patients who have received suspicious prescriptions.253
Often, the affidavit then cites some source of expertise to demon-
strate that the target registrant's practices, as evidenced by the ex-
periences of the undercover officers and other patients, are
inappropriate. Statements of expertise may be quotations from rec-
ognized texts, such as the Physician's Desk Reference 4 setting
forth the proper circumstances under which the controlled sub-
stances at issue should be prescribed.z 5 Statements from a practic-
249. 21 U.S.C. § 880(b)(4) (1984); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.04 (1993).
250. E.g., Borromeo, 954 F.2d at 246 (patient billing records).
251. E.g., Nechy, 827 F.2d at 1165.
252. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584 (1971).
253. See Jeffrey D. Lane, The Respectable Pusher, in FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT
BULLETIN 11-14 (Oct. 1991) for a discussion of various investigative techniques used
in these types of cases.
254. The PHYSICANS' DESK REFERENCE (47th ed. 1993) [hereinafter PDR] is a
commonly used guide that provides information about the approved uses and possi-
ble side effects of medication.
255. In United States v. Johnson, 831 F.2d 124, 130 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied
sub nom. Taylor v. United States, 485 U.S. 968 (1988), two experts called by the
government "testified that the PDR was recognized as a reference but was not con-
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ing physician or other medical practitioner who has reviewed the
case are also acceptable.2 6 Such expert evidence is not required
where the illegality is so clear that no special medical judgment is
necessary to determine that probable cause exists.7
The fact that the records in question are probably in the doctor's
office is generally established through the statements of undercover
officers, patients, and evidence of the general practice of physicians
to create and maintain patient records. While this level of proof
provides an unimpeachable basis for the belief that evidence is in
the target physician's office, the Sixth Circuit found probable cause
to believe that patients' medical records were at the doctor's office
based merely on the fact that the patients' names appeared on pre-
scriptions written by the doctor. 8
Finally, the records themselves need to be described. First, a spe-
cific request is made for the records of those patients reasonably
suspected of receiving controlled substances that were illegally dis-
pensed or prescribed. 59 Second, in the author's experience, there
generally is a request for all other records that evidence a similar
pattern of misprescribing.2 °
Criminal search warrants of this type have been challenged for
being "general."26' The Fourth Amendment requires that a search
sidered authoritative, although the defendant's expert claimed that the PDR was an
authority." See also United States v. Larson, 722 F.2d 139, 140 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 907 (1984) (noting government introduced evidence from the
PDR); United States v. Irwin, 661 F.2d 1063, 1069 n.11 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 856 (1982) (noting the PDR was read to the jury).
256. E.g., United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1355 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987). After reviewing Dr. Hayes's prescriptions, a medical
consultant "concluded that there was a high probability that Hayes 'caused, abetted,
or prolonged addi[c]tion or habituation to controlled substances."' Id.
257. United States v. Krasnoff, 480 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting
that facts surrounding the prescribing clearly showed illegal conduct).
258. United States v. Word, 806 F.2d 658, 662 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 922 (1987).
259. E.g., United States v. Borromeo, 954 F.2d 245,246 (4th Cir. 1992) (granting
request for access to suspect patient's records).
260. E.g., United States v. Betancourt, 734 F.2d 750,755 (11th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Gerwitz v. United States, 469 U.S. 1021, and cert. denied sub nom. Sando
v. United States, 469 U.S. 1076 (1984) (regarding the specific description of re-
quested records).
261. E.g., United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1354-56 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that warrants for search and seizure of physicians' offices were not "general" be-
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warrant describe with particularity the things to be seized.2 62 War-
rants that do not satisfy the particularity requirement are considered
"general" and evidence seized pursuant to such a warrant is inad-
missible.263 However, as long as the description of the items to be
seized is sufficiently detailed so that total discretion is not vested in
the seizing officers and the description is "as specific as the circum-
stances and nature of the activity permit[s]," the warrant will be
upheld.2 4
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Hayes,265 upheld a warrant
that authorized the seizure from three separate medical offices of
"all records which document the purchasing, dispensing, and pre-
scribing of controlled substances, including, but not limited to,
records contained in patient charts and all relevant records required
to be maintained by... [Federal and State law]; patient logs, ap-
pointment books and other records and ledgers reflecting distribu-
tion of controlled substances. '2 66 This search warrant was based on
an affidavit showing that fifty-eight patients had been illegally pre-
scribed Schedule II controlled substances.267 However, since the
defendant did not attack the magistrate's finding that there was
probable cause to seize all records relating to all controlled sub-
stances, the search was sustained.268
cause the officers could only seize documents regarding controlled substances), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987).
262. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
263. E.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195-96 (1927) (requiring partic-
ular descriptions for search warrants).
264. E.g., Betancourt, 734 F.2d at 755. In Betancourt, the warrants were for
medical clinics that were described as "prescription-mills." In each case the warrant
sought, and the court upheld, requests for "patient records, limited to those records
showing the dates of patient visits, all diagnostic tests performed and results ob-
tained, diagnoses made, medications prescribed and the name of the diagnosing phy-
sician, from on or about June 15, 1981 [January 1, 1982], to the present which are
evidence of violations of Title 21, United States Codes, Section 841(a)(1)." Id. This
warrant is as broad as possible. It was upheld because the evidence showed that
over 99% of the prescriptions issued by these clinics were probably illegal. Cf.
United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1980) (invalidating warrant for pa-
tient records in a Medicaid fraud investigation for being too general).
265. 794 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987).
266. Id at 1355.
267. Id. at 1356 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 1355.
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As the dissent in Hayes points out, the warrant would have been
better drawn if it had been limited in the first instance to the records
of the fifty-eight identified patients, and then allowed the seizure of
all other records related to the prescribing of Schedule II controlled
substances.269 Such a warrant could not be challenged as it related
to the fifty-eight named individuals because there was a specific
finding of probable cause that was firmly based on the affidavit.
Thus, if a reviewing court ultimately found that this was the limit of
probable cause, the seizure of these records could be severed and
upheld.27°
Second, based on a finding of probable cause relating to the fifty-
eight patients, there is inferential support for a finding that the doc-
tor is probably engaged in a pattern and practice of illegally pre-
scribing Schedule II controlled substances. This finding in turn
would support the issuance of a warrant for records relating to all
instances of the prescribing of those drugs. It is more difficult to
discern how these recitals would support any finding that all of the
doctor's controlled substance prescriptions, regardless of schedule,
were illegal without additional evidence that the doctor was not en-
gaged in a legitimate medical business.
The seizure of medical records pursuant to a criminal search war-
rant intrudes on the privacy rights of patients. Although patients do
have a privacy right in this context, it is subject to a balancing
against the legitimate interests of the State in securing the informa-
tion.271 In one case where the balancing test was applied, produc-
tion was required where disclosure was to a grand jury and the
district court specifically directed the government attorneys to main-
tain confidentiality.272
269. Id. at 1358 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Borromeo,
954 F.2d 245, 246 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 3012 (1992) (allowing the admis-
sion of 35 named patients' records).
270. Borromeo, 954 F.2d at 246-47.
271. In re Search Warrant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67,71-73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1007 (1987). See also United States v. Burzynski Cancer Research Inst., 819
F.2d 1301, 1311 & n.33 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The patients had no legitimate expectation
of privacy in the records maintained by Dr. Burzynski that could be asserted against
the search warrant."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1065 (1988); United States v. Colletta,
602 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that records seized pursuant to search
warrant were admissible at trial), affd, 770 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1985).
272. In re Search Warrant, 810 F.2d at 69-73.
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Special problems arise if the records relate to treatment for drug
abuse or alcohol abuse in a program "directly or indirectly assisted
by any department or agency of the United States" because of the
statutory protection given to these records. 73
3. Grand Jury Subpoena
Records can also be obtained through the use of a grand jury sub-
poena.2 74 However, subpoenas create problems for the government
that do not exist in the case of a criminal search warrant. First, there
are Fifth Amendment implications in the use of a subpoena. Sub-
poenaed individuals can resist the production of their personal
records if the act of turning them over would tend to incriminate
them. 75 Second, there may be privacy implications as well. A phy-
sician may resist turning over medical records based on the physi-
cian-patient privilege. 76 Third, the subpoenaed individual may
object to the scope of the subpoena as being burdensome or oppres-
sive, requiring litigation of the subpoena's validity before any
records can be obtained. Fourth, subpoenaed records are subject to
grand jury secrecy, a problem that does not arise when records are
taken during a search. Fifth, the recipient of a subpoena can object
to it in court, thereby delaying the investigation and possibly result-
ing in a reduction in the information obtained. Finally, records can
be tampered with prior to being produced in response to a sub-
273. 42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-3, 290ee-3 (1988); 42 CF.R. § 2.1 (1992). The statutes
provide for the disclosure of records from treatment programs upon the following:
[A]n appropriate order of a court ... after application showing good cause
therefor. In assessing good cause the court shall weigh the public interest and
the need for disclosure against the injury to the patient, to the physician-patient
relationship, and to the treatment services. Upon the granting of such order,
the court, in determining the extent to which any disclosure of all or any part of
any records is necessary, shall impose appropriate safeguards against unauthor-
ized disclosure.
42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-3(b)(2)(C), 290ee-3(b)(2)(C) (1988).
274. See, e.g., United States v. Lartey, 716 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that
grand jury subpoenas may lawfully obtain pharmacy records); United States v.
Plesons, 560 F.2d 890 (5th Cir.) (acknowledging the lawful use of grand jury subpoe-
nas to obtain pharmacy records), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); United States V.
Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 199 n.15 (9th Cir.) (describing the acquisition of patient
records through a grand jury subpoena), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975).
275. E.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-17 (1984).
276. See infra notes 284-94 and accompanying text.
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poena. These problems generally lead law enforcement to favor ad-
ministrative inspection or criminal search warrants.277
The application of the Fifth Amendment privilege in this context
may be limited. First, the privilege does not apply to the records of
a corporation, including a physician's professional corporation or an
incorporated pharmacy.'s Furthermore, the contents of voluntarily
prepared business records do not fall within the scope of the privi-
lege because their creation was not compelled.2 79 Second, the privi-
lege does not apply to records required to be kept by law.2" The
"required records" exception applies to documents that satisfy a
three-part test:
(1) the requirement that they be kept must be essentially regu-
latory, (2) the records must be of a kind that the regulated party
has customarily kept, and (3) the records themselves must have
assumed "public aspects" that render them analogous to public
documents. 28'
This exception has been applied to require the production of both
prescription records and patient files. Because judicial interpre-
tation of state law regulating the practice of medicine requires the
creation and maintenance of medical records, these records satisfy
the test set out above.3
277. See United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1358 n.5 (9th Cir. 1986) (describ-
ing the government's method of obtaining criminal search warrants after the target
physician resisted its efforts to subpoena records).
278. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361 (1911); Lartey, 716 F.2d at 961 n.3; In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 642 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983); United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 568-
69 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976); Reamer v. Beall, 506 F.2d 1345 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces
Tecum Dated January 30, 1986, 638 F. Supp. 794,799 (D. Me. 1986); In re Jellen, 521
F. Supp. 251, 252-53 (N.D. W. Va. 1981); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 460 F. Supp.
150, 151 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
279. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). However, the act of production
may be privileged. Id. at 612-14.
280. E.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
281. In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1189-91 (2d Cir. 1983).
282. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, John Doe, M.D., 801 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir.
1986) (per curiam) (holding that records relating to purchase, sale, and prescription
of anabolic steroids are not privileged under California law); In re Kenny, 715 F.2d
51 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that medical records and X-rays are not privileged under
New Jersey law); In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that prescriptions
and medical records are not privileged under New York law).
283. Kenney, 715 F.2d at 52-53; Doe, 711 F.2d at 1187.
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A practitioner may object to complying with a subpoena on the
basis of the physician-patient privilege, arguing that the privilege
prevents the production of the individual patient's records.284 Be-
cause there was no such privilege under federal common law, and
none was adopted as part of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, most federal courts have concluded that none exists under
federal law and have rejected the privilege as a basis of refusing to
produce patient records.2 5
The physician-patient privilege objection has also been rejected
because it was found not to apply to the facts of prescription drug
cases. First, "the purpose of such a privilege is the protection of the
patient and it cannot be asserted by the physician. '28 6 Second, the
records sought are not privileged because they are not those of
"9patients.'' I
Professor Wigmore has articulated four conditions necessary to
the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of communi-
cations. They are:
284. The privilege generally shields the physician from disclosing information
received from patients in the course of treatment. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-
307(a) (1981). The physician-patient privilege has been enacted in about three-
fourths of the states. 2 WEiNsTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE UNITED
STATES RuLEs § 504[01] (1991).
285. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 40 (1977) (holding that there is no physician-pa-
tient privilege at common law); Doe, 711 F.2d at 1193 (same); United States v. Mea-
gher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir.) (holding that no psychiatrist-patient privilege is
recognized in federal criminal trials), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976); United States
v. Witt, 542 F. Supp. 696, 697-98 (S.D.N.Y.) (declining to recognize a physician-
patient privilege), affid without op., 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982); Hardy v. Riser, 309
F. Supp. 1234, 1236-37 (N.D. Miss. 1970) (holding that physician testimony is not
subject to physician-patient privilege). See United States v. Colletta, 602 F. Supp.
1322, 1327 (E.D. Pa.) (noting absence of federal common law physician-patient priv-
ilege), affd without op., 770 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp.
433, 438 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (noting that the court was unable to find a case granting
clear recognition of the physician-patient privilege).
The existence in the federal courts of a psychotherapist-patient privilege, different
from the physician-patient privilege, is a matter of dispute. The Second and Sixth
Circuits recognize the privilege. See, e.g., In re John Doe, 964 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir.
1992) (recognizing psychotherapist-patient privilege); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632,
639 (6th Cir.) (recognizing the existence of psychotherapist-patient privilege but rul-
ing it inapplicable), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
286. In re Jellen, 521 F. Supp. 251, 253 (N.D. W. Va. 1981) (quoting City &
County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 231 P.2d 26, 26 (Cal. 1951) (holding that
the psychoanalyst-patient privilege may only be used to protect the patient)).
287. E.g., In re Doe, 711 F.2d at 1194.
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(1) the communications must be made in the belief that it will
not be disclosed; (2) confidentiality must be essential to the
maintenance of the relationship between the parties; (3) the re-
lationship should be one that society considers worthy of being
fostered; and, (4) the injury to the relationship incurred by dis-
closure must be greater than the benefit gained in the correct
disposal of litigation.m
In the situation where the patient's primary purpose in visiting the
doctor is to illegally secure drugs rather than seek treatment, there
is no physician-patient relationship and the privilege does not ap-
ply- 89 Furthermore, in the situation of a criminal investigation of
drug abuse under these circumstances, the required balancing pro-
cess generally favors the government. 2 °
Even if the privilege were found to apply, it would not shield in-
formation regarding an office visit and the writing of a prescrip-
tion.29 The privilege is designed to protect communications from
patients to their physicians that are necessary for the patients'
treatment.
The privilege is intended to protect only those communications
that are necessary for obtaining the benefits of the professional
relationship - in other words, for enabling the physician to
prescribe remedies or relief.
The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date
of the consultation and the number of the consultations are
therefore not privileged from disclosure so long as the subject
communicated is not stated.29
Claims that the production of such records invade the patient's
privacy interests are also unsuccessful if it is found that "a person
possesses no reasonable expectation that his medical history will re-
main completely confidential."293 However, if the records relate to
288. Id. at 1193 (citing 8 J. WiGMOER, EVIDENCE § 2285 (1961)).
289. Id.
290. Id.; Witt, 542 F. Supp. at 698. See also Grand Jury Subpoena, 710 F. Supp.
at 1014 (holding that the psychotherapist-patient relationship does not apply when it
is potentially criminal in nature).
291. In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640-41 (6th Cir.) (finding the identity of the
patient and the fact and time of his treatment not privileged), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
983 (1983).
292. 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§ 2383-2384 (1961).
293. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, John Doe, M.D., 801 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th
Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
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treatment for drug or alcohol abuse in a federally funded program, a
court order is required to obtain any patient records.294
C. Indictment
As outlined below, there has been significant debate over the ap-
propriate form of a registrant's indictment under the CSA. Courts
have taken differing positions on whether the crime was "distribu-
tion" or "dispensation," and whether there need be an allegation
that the prescribing was outside of the usual course of medical prac-
tice. Based on the author's experience, the following wording ap-
pears sufficient to resolve all challenges that have been raised:
On or about [date], within the [judicial district], [defendant]1 95
did knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully distribute and dis-
pense [and attempt to distribute and dispense] - tablets of
[drug - trade name and active ingredient], a Schedule -
[narcotic drug] controlled substance pursuant to a prescription
which was issued not in the usual course of professional prac-
tice for a legitimate medical reason, in violation of Title 21,
United States Code, Section 841(a) and Title 21, Code of Fed-
eral Regulations, Section 1306.04.
1. Distribute or Dispense
The CSA defines distribution as "to deliver (other than adminis-
tering or dispensing) a controlled substance or a listed chemical. ' 96
It further defines "deliver" as "the actual, constructive or attempted
transfer of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether or
not there exists an agency relationship.' '2 1 The writing of a pre-
scription constitutes the constructive or attempted transfer of a con-
trolled substance because it is the necessary predicate to obtaining
the drug. Therefore, physicians who write prescriptions that are not
in the usual course of medical practice for a legitimate medical rea-
294. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
295. Either in introductory language, or as part of the identification of the de-
fendant, it should be alleged that the defendant was a person registered with the
Drug Enforcement Administration to prescribe, distribute, and/or dispense con-
trolled substances only in the usual course of medical practice for a legitimate medi-
cal reason. In the case of a pharmacist, it should be alleged that the prescription was
issued by a physician in the usual course of his medical practice for a legitimate
medical reason.
296. 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) (Supp. IV 1992).
297. 21 U.S.C. § 802(8) (Supp. IV 1992).
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son "distribute" controlled substances - even though others need
to take action by filling the prescription before the controlled sub-
stance actually comes into the possession of the "patient."
[B]y creating the means by which controlled substances can be
transferred, a doctor "distributes" within the meaning of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a) by the act of writing a prescription outside the
usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate
medical purpose.298
In contrast, "dispense" means to deliver "pursuant to the lawful
order of a practitioner, including the prescribing and administering
"..,299 Reasoning from these "definitions," some courts have held
that a registrant could only be charged with "dispensing" because
that definition is restricted to the act of prescribing.3°° Others have
concluded that the proper charge was "distributing" because "dis-
pensing" included the lawful prescription of the drugs.30'
The First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have agreed that the physician
who delivers a controlled substance outside of the course of profes-
sional practice is guilty of "distribution" and not dispensing.30 2 As
the Ninth Circuit said in United States v. Black,3 3
By definition "dispense" expressly contemplates a "lawful or-
der;" if the order is not such, the prescription is not lawful
under 21 U.S.C. § 829. If the prescription is not lawful, the
"practitioner" does not dispense; rather, under § 802(11), he
"distributes" - that is, he effects delivery "other than by dis-
298. United States v. Davis, 564 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1015 (1978); see also United States v. Ellzey, 527 F.2d 1306,1308 (6th Cir. 1976)
(holding that a physician who prescribed amphetamines without examining the pa-
tients was guilty of conspiring to distribute a controlled substance).
However, possession of a prescription is not equivalent to constructive possession
of the drug described therein because there is no legal duty of a pharmacist to fill
every prescription presented. United States v. Walker, 972 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir.
1992).
299. 21 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1988).
300. See infra note 309 and accompanying text for a discussion of circuits hold-
ing that a registrant can only be charged with dispensing.
301. See infra notes 302-08 and accompanying text.
302. United States v. ElIzey, 527 F.2d 1306, 1308 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Black, 512 F.2d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296, 298
(1st Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
303. 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975).
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pensing." In short, a "practitioner" who dispenses does not vio-
late the Act."
Other circuits disagree. In United States v. Leigh,05 the Fifth Cir-
cuit determined that "dispensing" was the appropriate charge, sus-
taining the dismissal of an indictment which alleged that a physician
"did knowingly and intentionally distribute and cause to be distrib-
uted... a controlled substance by means of a prescription .... "306
The court, citing the definitions of "dispense" and "distribute,"
found that the indictment did not charge an offense within the appli-
cable statute.3° The court did not address the failure of the indict-
ment to allege that the distribution was "unlawful" nor that the
prescriptions were outside the scope of acceptable medical
practice.308
The Third and Seventh Circuits both sustained convictions al-
leging "dispensing. 3 09  The Tenth Circuit sustained convictions
for both "dispensing" and "distributing; '310 it also concluded that
304. Id. at 866. Accord Davis, 564 F.2d at 844-45 (holding that a doctor who
issues a prescription for a non-medical reason is guilty of distributing); United States
v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 200 (9th Cir.) (holding that a doctor who prescribed a
controlled substance outside of the scope of his practice was guilty of distributing),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975).
305. 487 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1973).
306. Id. at 207.
307. Id. at 208.
308. In a subsequent case, the Fifth Circuit stated that the reason the physician
in Leigh could not be indicted for distribution was because the indictment failed to
allege that he unlawfully administered or prescribed the drug. United States v. Har-
rison, 651 F.2d 353, 354 n.1 (5th Cir. July 1981) (en banc), reh'g denied, 657 F.2d
1251 (5th Cir. Sept. 1981), and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981). The Fifth Circuit
affirmed a conviction for illegal dispensing in United States v. Rogers, 609 F.2d 834,
840 (5th Cir. 1980).
309. United States v. Roya, 574 F.2d 386, 394 (7th Cir.) (sustaining the convic-
tion for dispensing on the ground that the defendant physician prescribed the drugs
outside of the course of his professional practice), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 857 (1978);
United States v. Tighe, 551 F.2d 18,21 (3d Cir.) (affirming the conviction of a physi-
cian for dispensing), cert denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
310. United States v. Smurthwaite, 590 F.2d 889, 892 (10th Cir. 1979) (sustaining
convictions for dispensing and distributing); United States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181,
183 (10th Cir. 1977) (sustaining conviction for distributing); United States v. Jobe,
487 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1973) (sustaining conviction for distributing), cert. de-
nied, 416 U.S. 955 (1974); United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484,489 (10th Cir. 1973)
(sustaining conviction for dispensing).
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there was no difference between the two for double jeopardy pur-
poses. 311
After the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Moore,31 2
the Fifth Circuit sustained the conviction of a physician for illegal
"distribution." 313 Although the case contains no reference to the
court's previous decision in Leigh, the Fifth Circuit cited Moore for
the proposition that a physician could be prosecuted for dispensing
or distributing.314 In a later case, United States v. Thompson,3 5 the
Fifth Circuit considered and rejected the argument that a physician
was improperly charged with dispensing instead of distributing.316
The court noted, however, that even if the indictment was incorrect,
Thompson suffered no prejudice from the mistake.31 7 Finally, the
Fifth Circuit explained the rationale of its Leigh decision in United
States v. Harrison.318 In Harrison, the court stated:
Here the indictment charged distribution that was "unlawful"
and "for other than a legitimate medical purpose and not in the
usual course of medical practice." This states an offense. The
allegations present in this case protect the doctor from expo-
sure to criminal prosecution for errors of judgment as to the
amount prescribed and as to the necessity for the
prescription.319
More recently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a conviction that charged
unlawful distribution and dispensation.32
311. United States v. Genser, 710 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1983). Genser, a non-
practitioner, was indicted for "dispensing." The charge was dismissed during his
trial because he was not a practitioner and therefore could not be convicted for
"dispensing." His subsequent indictment for "distributing" was ordered dismissed
by the court of appeals on double jeopardy grounds.
312. 423 U.S. 131 (1975).
313. United States v. Dunbar, 614 F.2d 39 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 926 (1980).
314. Id. at 41.
315. 624 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1980).
316. Id. at 741-42.
317. Id. at 742 n.2.
318. 651 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. July 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981). The
indictment charged a doctor with "unlawfully and knowingly distribut[ing] and
caus[ing] to be distributed a controlled substance for other than a legitimate medical
purpose and not in the usual course of professional practice." Id. at 353.
319. Id. at 354-55.
320. United States v. Schuster, 777 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir.), vacated, 778 F.2d
1132 (5th Cir. 1985).
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While most pharmacists appear to have been charged with illegal
distribution,321 some have been charged with illegal dispensing. 22
The only court to address this distinction held that a pharmacist had
been incorrectly charged with distributing instead of dispensing, but
held that such error was harmless. In United States v. Nechy, 323 the
Seventh Circuit held that Nechy, a pharmacist, was a "dispenser."3 24
The court, after citing the definition of "dispensing" as meaning "to
deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research sub-
ject by, or pursuant to the lawful order of, a practitioner, including
the prescribing... of a controlled substance," stated:
Since "practitioner" includes a pharmacist licensed to dispense
a controlled substance, see § 802(20), the fact that Nechy was
not acting under the lawful order (valid prescription) of a doc-
tor does not prevent him from being deemed an illegal dis-
penser, just as a doctor would be a dispenser if he gave a drug
to a patient even though the doctor would not be doing so "pur-
suant to the lawful order of' anyone .... Since Nechy was a
dispenser, and since under the statute a dispenser cannot also
be a distributor - "The term 'distribute' means to deliver
(other than by administering or dispensing) a controlled sub-
stance," § 802(11) - [defendant] was indicted and convicted
for a different offense from the one he committed.32
The court held, however, that the variance between the indictment
that charged distribution and the proof was harmless.326 The court
did not state that an indictment so worded should be dismissed.
321. United States v. Hammond, 781 F.2d 1536, 1537 (11th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Lartey, 716 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Lawson, 682 F.2d
480,481 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d
207, 209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); United States v. Schiffman, 572
F.2d 1137, 1138 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kershman, 555 F.2d 198, 199 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977); United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 817
(9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1031 (1975).
322. United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); United
States v. Irwin, 661 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 907
(1982).
323. 827 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1987).
324. Id. at 1169.
325. Id. at 1168-69 (citations omitted; emphasis original). Nechy was indicted
and convicted for a different offense than the one that he committed. Id.
326. Id. at 1169.
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2. Outside the Usual Course of Accepted Medical Practice
There is a split in authority as to the necessity of an allegation in
the indictment that the defendant acted outside the usual course of
professional practice. As noted above, the distribution or dispens-
ing by a practitioner of a controlled substance is only illegal if done
outside of the usual course of medical practice or pursuant to a pre-
scription that was so issued.327 However, the statute provides:
It shall not be necessary for the United States to negative any
exemption or exception set forth in this subchapter in any com-
plaint, information, indictment, or other pleading or in any trial,
hearing, or other proceeding under this subchapter, and the
burden of going forward with the evidence with respect to any
such exemption or exception shall be upon the person claiming
its benefit.328
In United States v. Black,32 9 the Ninth Circuit held that this provi-
sion, at most, requires the practitioner to present evidence that he is
a "practitioner" - evidence that is generally brought out in the gov-
ernment's case-in-chief.33 1 Once such evidence has been produced,
the burden shifts to the government to prove that the prescriptions
were not issued in the usual course of medical practice.3 31 The prac-
titioner is not required to show that the prescriptions were issued in
the usual course of medical practice.332 The court stated that "[sec-
tion] 885(a)(1) effectively creates a presumption dictating that any
transfer of a controlled substance is non-authorized and conse-
quently criminal unless the accused introduces some evidence that
the transfer is lawful under the statute. 333
In United States v. King,334 the Ninth Circuit cited Black for the
proposition that lack of authorization to distribute or dispense is an
element of the crime.335 In Black, the Ninth Circuit held that the
indictment of a registrant must allege that the distribution was with-
327. See supra notes 28-52 and accompanying text.
328. 21 U.S.C. § 885(a)(1) (1988).
329. 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975).
330. Id. at 869.
331. See infra notes 361-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the burden
of proof.
332. Black, 512 F.2d at 870.
333. Id. at 868.
334. 587 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1978).
335. Id. at 963.
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out authorization even if the case does not involve allegations relat-
ing to the individual's professional practice. 3 6 The indictment
charged a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in a
"street" sale.3"7 The physician defendant was identified as a doctor
in the indictment when it named him as "Stanley E. Deal, M.D." 3 8
The doctor allegedly distributed an unknown quantity of cocaine.339
The Ninth Circuit held that lack of authorization is an essential ele-
ment of the offense and the failure to charge it required a reversal of
the doctor's conviction.3 40
The next court to consider this question, the Seventh Circuit,
came to a different result. In United States v. Roya,34' the indict-
ment included language that the defendant dispensed "pursuant to a
prescription not written in the course of professional practice.
3 42
After ruling that the inclusion of this language without citation to
the regulation from which it came does not make the indictment
impermissibly vague, the Seventh Circuit went on to hold that the
language was unnecessary.3 43 The court held that when an indict-
ment is founded on a general provision of a statute, it need not neg-
ative an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause,
whether in the same section or elsewhere. 3 "
The Fifth Circuit, after considering both King and Roya, adopted
the Ninth Circuit's position, holding that the language is required.
In United States v. Outler,34 5 the Fifth Circuit held that the absence
of an allegation that the prescription lacked a legitimate medical
reason was fatal to the indictment, and required dismissal because
there was no assurance that the grand jury had found probable
cause as to this element.346 The court reasoned that lack of a legiti-
336. Id. at 963-64.
337. Id. at 963. The indictment did not allege in either the general conspiracy
language or in the overt act that Dr. Deal "illegally" distributed controlled sub-
stances or that he intended to "illegally" possess with intent to distribute.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 963-64.
341. 574 F.2d 386 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 857 (1978).
342. Id. at 390.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 391.
345. 659 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982).
346. Id. at 1311.
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mate medical purpose was an "essential element" of the offense be-
cause it "embodies the culpability of the offense. Without behavior
beyond professional practice, there is no crime. ' 3 4 7
The Sixth Circuit took a different approach. In United States v.
Seelig,34 a group of pharmacists was charged with distribution of
certain drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) through the illegal
refilling of prescriptions.349 Noting that "the allegation of distribu-
tion in violation of § 841(a)(1) includes the legal definition that the
drugs were not dispensed, i.e., distributed in the usual course of pro-
fessional practice, 35° the court held that the specific language "not
in the usual course of professional practice" did not need to be in-
cluded in the indictment.35 '
In the most recent decision on this point, the Third Circuit in
United States v. Polan352 held that an indictment need not expressly
allege that the drug distribution was not authorized under the Act or
was not in the usual course of professional practice.353 The court's
opinion was based on the statutory language set out at the beginning
of this section3 54 and the Supreme Court's decision in McKelvey v.
United States. 355 The Third Circuit rejected the contrary decisions
of the Ninth and Fifth Circuits primarily because of their failure to
cite the statutory language set forth above, adopting instead the rea-
347. Id. at 1309.
348. 622 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
349. Id. at 211.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 212.
352. 970 F.2d 1280 (3d Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1367 (1993).
353. Id. at 1282.
354. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
355. 260 U.S. 353 (1922). The Third Circuit quoted the following language from
McKelvey:
By repeated decisions it has come to be a settled rule in this jurisdiction that an
indictment or other pleading founded on a general provision defining the ele-
ments of an offense, or of a right conferred, need not negative the matter of an
exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause, whether in the same sec-
tion or elsewhere, and that it is incumbent on one who relies on such an excep-
tion to set it up and establish it.
970 F.2d at 1282 (quoting McKelvey, 260 U.S. at 357 (1922)).
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soning of the Seventh Circuit in Roya as well as the cases decided
under the predecessor statute. 56
A requirement that the indictment expressly negative the exemp-
tion seems to be the stronger position. Indictments of practitioners
raise the fact of the defendant's practitioner status on the face of the
indictment either through identifying the defendant as a doctor in
the caption or through descriptive language elsewhere. Even in
King, which alleged a street level conspiracy, the physician was iden-
tified in the indictment as an "M.D. 357 Once the defendant's status
as a practitioner has been raised, the case falls outside of the situa-
tion addressed by the statutory language and it becomes incumbent
upon the government to allege that the defendant's activities were
outside of his practitioner status. So charging, however, does not
require use of language "outside of the usual course of professional
practice," although certainly it appears to be preferred. The Third
Circuit in Polan noted that the indictment's allegations that the de-
fendant acted "unlawfully" and that he "distributed" both show that
the act of prescribing was "not 'authorized' under the federal drug
laws and did not occur in the course of the defendant's professional
practice., 358
3. Counts
Each separate illegal prescription represents a different criminal
act even when they are issued to the same person on the same
day.359 Thus, each may be charged as a separate count in the
indictment.36
D. Trial
The government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that prescriptions issued by a physician were not issued in the
356. Polan, 970 F.2d at 1283. The Third Circuit cited United States v. Collier,
478 F.2d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 1973), and United States v. Rowlette, 397 F.2d 475, 479
(7th Cir. 1968), as cases decided under the predecessor statute.
357. King, 587 F.2d at 963.
358. Polan, 970 F.2d at 1283.
359. E.g., United States v. Thompson, 624 F.2d 740, 743 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Davis, 564 F.2d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978);
United States v. Krasnoff, 480 F. Supp. 723, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
360. See supra note 359.
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usual course of medical practice for a legitimate medical reason.36'
The elements that must be proven are:
(1) that [the defendant] distributed or dispensed a controlled
substance, (2) that he acted knowingly and intentionally, and
(3) that he did so other than for a legitimate medical purpose
and in the usual course of his professional practice.362
Generally, only the third element is truly at issue.
The government need not prove that the illegally issued prescrip-
tion was actually filled; the placing of such a prescription in the
hands of an ultimate user completes the offense.363 Generally, to
avoid any-confusion by the jury on this point, the prescriptions ob-
tained from a physician during an undercover operation are either
in fact filled, or the indictment charges both distribution and an at-
tempt to distribute the controlled substance called for on the
prescription.3 4
For a pharmacist, the government must show that the defendant,
charged with filling prescriptions not issued in the usual course of
medical practice, knew that they were so issued.365 This element of
knowledge may be inferred by the jury from proof that the pharma-
cist deliberately closed his eyes to the true nature of the
prescription. 36
1. Testimonial Issues
a. Admissibility of Prescriptions Not Charged In the Indictment
The prosecution often seeks to admit into evidence prescriptions
in addition to those specifically related to charges in the indictment.
361. United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975).
362. United States v. Rosen, 582 F.2d 1032, 1033 (5th Cir. 1978).
363. United States v. Tighe, 551 F.2d 18, 21 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823
(1977).
364. United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031
(1975) (holding that writing a prescription is all that is required for an attempt).
Attempt carries the same potential penalty as the completed act. 21 U.S.C. § 846
(1984).
365. United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135, 1143 n.11 (6th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Lawson, 682 F.2d 480, 482 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982);
United States v. Hayes, 595 F.2d 258, 260 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 856
(1979).
366. Lawson, 682 F.2d at 482; United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207, 213 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); United States v. Kershman, 555 F.2d 198,200
(8th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977).
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Generally, these prescriptions are either additional prescriptions
written for individuals named in the indictment as recipients of iMle-
gal prescriptions or prescriptions written for the same or similar
controlled substances as those mentioned in the indictment. 367
Prescriptions offered to prove that they were used to obtain the
drug indicated are not hearsay. Since uncharged prescriptions are
considered "other crimes evidence," Rule 404(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence controls their admissibility. Rule 404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, identity or absence of mistake or accident. 368
Rule 404(b) requires a balancing test. The trial court must deter-
mine "whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the proba-
tive value of the evidence" in ruling on its admissibility.369
For example, additional prescriptions are generally offered to
show motive, intent, and absence of mistake or accident.3 7° Given
the government's burden of showing that the charged prescriptions
were not issued in the usual course of professional treatment for a
legitimate medical reason, the additional prescriptions become rele-
vant and are generally admitted.371
Additional prescriptions issued to "patients" named in the indict-
ment have been held admissible. In both United States v. Bartee3 72
and United States v. Greenfield,37 3 the courts approved testimony
367. E.g., United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980).
368. FED. R. Evw. 404(b).
369. Id. See generally 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE UNITED
STATES RULES § 404[18] (1991).
370. United States v. Stump, 735 F.2d 273,275 (7th Cir.) (admitting evidence of
additional prescriptions to show intent, opportunity, plan, preparation, and lack of
mistake), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 864 (1984); United States v. Harrison, 651 F.2d 353,
355 (5th Cir. July 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981) (plan, design, or scheme);
United States v. Rogers, 609 F.2d 834, 839 (5th Cir. 1980) (intent, knowledge, mo-
tive, willfulness, plan, and scheme); United States v. ElIzey, 527 F.2d 1306, 1307-08
(6th Cir. 1976) (intent and willfulness); United States v. Abdallah, 149 F.2d 219, 223
(2d Cir.) (bad faith), cert denied, 326 U.S. 724 (1945); Melanson v. United States,
256 F. 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1919) (bad faith).
371. See, e.g., Harrison, 651 F.2d at 355.
372. 479 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973).
373. 574 F.2d 305 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978).
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about visits to the defendant physician before and/or after the in-
dicted instances. The Greenfield court noted that such testimony
was "clearly material to the question whether [Greenfield's] contin-
uing prescriptions for the same patient . . . were for a legitimate
medical purpose. The evidence was not inflammatory, the judge is-
sued a proper limiting instruction .... I
However, where a patient was unsure which of the prescriptions
written to him were legitimate and which were not, the trial court
refused to allow admission of those additional prescriptions about
which the patient had no clear recollection. 375 When the govern-
ment could not establish a prima facie case that these prescriptions
had been issued illegally,376 the court, upon a motion for reconsider-
ation, allowed admission of the prescriptions knowingly written
under fictitious names because the illegality, and recollection
thereof, was clear.377
Prescriptions written for persons other than those mentioned in
the indictment are also offered to show that the charged registrant is
operating outside the usual course of medical practice.378 Thus, pre-
scriptions may be offered to show that the doctor was freely pre-
scribing controlled substances not commonly prescribed within the
medical community;3 79 that the defendant was involved in a continu-
ing scheme of unlawful practice outside the scope of a legitimate
medical practice spanning a single period of time;38 0 that the physi-
cian was prescribing controlled substances over inappropriate
lengths of time or for inappropriate diseases;3 8' that the physician
was prescribing a "grab-bag" of controlled substances to particular
patients;382 and that a substantial part of the physician's practice was
devoted to writing prescriptions for controlled substances which ex-
374. Id. at 308.
375. United States v. Jamieson, 605 F. Supp. 119, 123-25 (D. Kan. 1985).
376. Id. at 121.
377. Id. at 124-25.
378. E.g., United States v. Rogers, 609 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1980). See also United
States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.) (applying rule to pharmacists), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 869 (1980).
379. Use of such prescriptions as evidence has been observed by the author in
his personal experience.
380. United States v. Stump, 735 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
864 (1984).
381. See supra note 379.
382. See supra note 379.
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pert testimony shows is contrary to the usual course of medical
practice. 3
The mass of evidence offered under these circumstances has been
substantial.38' For instance, in United States v. Ellzey,3 15 the prose-
cution offered into evidence three suitcases containing 29,000 pre-
scriptions.3 8 6  The government also introduced a survey of
amphetamine prescriptions that had been filled in six local drug
stores.3 7 The survey showed that a total of 39,000 prescriptions for
Schedule II controlled substances had been written by 152 physi-
cians and dentists over 22 months.388 Of those 39,000 prescriptions,
Dr. Ellzey had written 29,000, and all but 200 of his Schedule II
prescriptions were for amphetamines or amphetamine-like drugs.38 9
The trial court admitted these additional prescriptions as relevant to
issues of intent and willfulness and gave a limiting instruction.
390
The Sixth Circuit found no error.3 91
In United States v. Jackson, 3 1 the prosecution offered 5,000 pre-
scriptions written over a 15-month period that were unrelated to the
383. Experts have expressed the opinion that, on average, general practitioners
do not write more than 50% of their prescriptions for controlled substances and that
the percentage reaches that level only because of the common prescribing of Darvon
and Valium. See United States v. Hammond, 781 F.2d 1536, 1537 (11th Cir. 1986)
(noting expert testimony that prescription practice consisting of 90% controlled sub-
stances was "outrageously high and dramatically out of line with the practice of
other physicians").
384. United States v. Coward, 669 F.2d 180 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946
(1982) (concerning 800 prescriptions written by the defendant doctor and filled by
the defendant pharmacist); United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46, 49 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Ellzey, 527 F.2d 1306, 1307 (6th Cir. 1976). See also United States
v. Henry, 727 F.2d 1373, 1377-78 (5th Cir.) (allowing introduction of additional pre-
scriptions filled by defendant pharmacist for testifying "patient" to show knowledge
of absence of legitimate medical need for the controlled substances charged in the
indictment), rev'd on other grounds, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
385. 527 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1976).
386. Id. at 1307.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. ElIzey, 527 F.2d at 1307. The limiting instruction given is not set forth in
the appellate opinion.
391. Id. See also United States v. Devous, 764 F.2d 1349, 1351 (10th Cir. 1985)
(noting testimony that the Demoral ordered by the defendant physician for "office
use" in his office in a small town was more than that used at the hospital in a nearby
bigger town).
392. 576 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1978).
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charges in the indictment. 93 The Fifth Circuit ruled that the pre-
scriptions were relevant to prove motive because they helped to es-
tablish that Dr. Jackson was "in the business of writing prescriptions
for drugs commonly used 'on the street.' Moreover, each prescrip-
tion was for twenty-four tablets [of Quaaludes] and each was filled
at the same pharmacy. 394
Prescriptions other than those charged in the indictment have
been offered against pharmacists as well. In United States v.
Henry,395 the prosecution offered prescriptions that were written by
a physician other than the one whose prescriptions formed the basis
of the indictment. 96 The trial court approved the additional pre-
scriptions as showing:
[T]he relationship between the defendant and the doctor, to im-
peach defendant's testimony that he had no knowledge of the
confidential informant's intention to misuse the drugs, and gen-
erally to show acts substantially identical to the charged
offenses.39
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's acceptance of the
prescriptions.398
The admission of other prescriptions, however, cannot be allowed
to overwhelm the charges in the indictment and to bootstrap an
otherwise weak case. In United States v. Jones,3 99 Dr. Jones was
charged with two counts of illegally distributing Quaaludes to an
undercover police officer." The government offered 478 prescrip-
tions written over a 20-month period for Schedule 11 drugs other
than Quaaludes.4°1 The government also offered testimony that
many of the people for whom these prescriptions had been written
had "recognizable track marks."4 2 The Eighth Circuit noted, how-
393. Id. at 49.
394. Id.
395. 727 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.
1984) (en banc).
396. Id. at 1377.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 1378. See also United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207, 214 (6th Cir.)
(noting 32 sales charged, while evidence of 1,409 sales offered), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980).
399. 570 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1978).
400. Id. at 766.
401. Id. at 767.
402. Id.
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ever, that "the prosecution did not introduce any evidence concern-
ig the doctor-patient relationship existing with respect to these
prescriptions, nor did it present other proof that the prescriptions
had not been issued for a proper medical purpose. '4 3 The court
ruled that "[a]bsent any evidence bearing upon Dr. Jones' treatment
of the patients in question, issuance of the prescriptions without
more does not show that Dr. Jones acted unprofessionally in using
these prescriptions," and their admission was error.4 4
Summaries are sometimes offered in the form of charts or testi-
mony because of the large volume of prescriptions at issue.4" 5 This
evidence can summarize transactions involving named individuals,
or demonstrate that other physicians are not writing or other phar-
macists are not filling such prescriptions in the quantities in which
they are written or filled by the defendant. For instance, in United
States v. Hammond,40 6 the government offered evidence showing
that the defendant's pharmacy purchased 82.3% of the Diderex sold
in a wholesale sales territory comprised of 66 pharmacies, 35.2% of
that sold in north Georgia, and 19.5% of that sold in the entire
state.40 7 Furthermore, the volume sold at the defendant pharmacy
was compared to two other pharmacies in the same town.40 In one
year, Hammond's pharmacy sold 512,500 tablets, compared to 2,700
and 5,200 for the other pharmacies.40 9 In another case, the govern-
ment used summaries to prove that over a two-year period the phar-
macy had received over 40,000 tablets of Talwin, approximately 20%
of the amount prescribed in the State of Illinois during that
period.410
Under Rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidentiary
summaries are permissible where a case involves "voluminous writ-
ings.., which cannot be conveniently examined in court., 411 How-
ever, Rule 1006 requires that the underlying material be made
403. Id at 768.
404. Jones, 570 F.2d at 768.
405. E.g., United States v. Hammond, 781 F.2d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1986).
406. 781 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1986).
407. Id. at 1538.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. United States v. Roth, 777 F.2d 1200, 1201 (7th Cir. 1985).
411. FED. R. Evm. 1006.
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available to all parties for inspection and copying.412 In order to
introduce evidence of such a summary, a proper foundation must be
laid through the testimony of the witness who supervised its prepa-
ration.41 3 To meet the foundation requirement, the government
generally offers testimony about the seizure of the prescriptions be-
ing summarized, the determination of which prescriptions were to
be summarized, and the preparation of the information on the chart
so that it accurately reflects the information contained on the pre-
scriptions.414 Although such evidence is admissible if properly pre-
pared and fairly presented,411 the trial court should generally give a
limiting instruction indicating that the summaries are merely aids in
evaluating evidence, and not evidence in and of themselves.41 6
When the summary evidence offered is comparative, the compari-
sons must be valid.417 In two cases involving doctors, courts ap-
proved comparisons of the volume of their Schedule II prescriptions
filled at particular pharmacies to that of other doctors whose pre-
scriptions were filled at those same pharmacies. 4tm In a case involv-
ing a podiatrist, testimony was elicited comparing the amount of the
drug hydrocodone ordered by the defendant to the amount ordered
by other podiatrists in his state as well as by the average pharmacy,
hospital, and physician in the United States.40 1 9 In contrast, in a case
concerning a summary comparison of the amount of drugs dis-
412. Id.
413. United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558, 563 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
946 (1979).
414. See, e.g., United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154, 161 (10th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Wilkett v. United States, 459 U.S. 1088 (1982).
415. United States v. Schuster, 777 F.2d 264,269 (5th Cir.) (admitting chart that
recompiled prescriptions to correspond with counts of the indictment together with
explanations of the drug usages, potencies, and side effects), vacated, 778 F.2d 1132
(5th Cir. 1985); Behrens, 689 F.2d at 154, 161; Seelig, 622 F.2d at 214; United States
v. Kirk, 584 F.2d 773 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1978); Ellzey, 527 F.2d at
1308. See also Scales, 594 F.2d at 563-64.
416. E.g., Seelig, 622 F.2d at 214.
417. Compare Kirk, 584 F.2d at 773, and Ellzey, 527 F.2d at 1306, with Seelig,
622 F.2d at 215-16 (holding that inappropriate comparisons constitute prejudicial
error).
418. Kirk, 584 F.2d at 773; Ellzey, 527 F.2d at 1306.
419. United States v. August, 984 F.2d 705,713 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 1993
U.S. LEXIS 5521 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1993). Dr. August did not challenge this testimony
on appeal. The testimony was clearly relevant given the size of the disparity: Au-
gust ordered 99% of the drug ordered by all podiatrists in the state. 984 F.2d at 708.
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pensed by the target pharmacy with that of others, the comparison
was disallowed because the prosecution failed to prove that all of
the pharmacies were truly comparable in terms of hours, clientele,
and total sales.42
b. Judicial Notice
The government sometimes seeks to streamline its presentation
by requesting that the court take judicial notice of certain uncontro-
vertible facts.42 In particular, the government may ask the court to
take judicial notice of the appropriate DEA regulations or the fact
that certain brand name drugs contain controlled substances that ap-
pear on particular schedules. 42
2
Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs judicial notice
of "adjudicative facts," the facts of a particular case. Rule 201(b)
provides that a judicially noticed fact "must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate
and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned."'4 A court may take judicial notice,
whether requested or not, but shall take judicial notice if requested
by a party and supplied with the necessary information.424 How-
ever, a party is entitled to be heard as to the propriety of taking
judicial notice.4' In a criminal case, the jury is instructed that "it
420. Seelig, 622 F.2d at 215-16.
421. Judicial notice is that process by which a court may declare certain proposi-
tions to be proven, on the basis of general policy considerations, without requiring
evidence of the same. It relieves a part of the burden of offering evidence of a
particular fact since judicial notice of that fact is the same as proof of it and has
equal force. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
422. United States v. Wisniewski, 741 F.2d 138, 142 (7th Cir. 1984) (concerning
certain drug on Schedule I); United States v. Harrison, 651 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir.
July 1981) (noticing that the generic names of the four drugs charged were listed in
the C.F.R. schedules for controlled substances).
These facts have also been proven by expert testimony, United States v. Dunbar,
614 F.2d 39, 41 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926 (1980), and through stipulation,
United States v. Boettjer, 569 F.2d 1078, 1079 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976
(1978).
423. FED. R. EvID. 201(b).
424. FnD. R. EVID. 201(c), (d).
425. FED. R. Evm. 201(e).
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may, but is not required, to accept as conclusive any fact judicially
noticed." '426
Courts are required to take judicial notice of the DEA regulations
as well as the presence within the various schedules of certain drugs
because they are published as part of the Federal Register.427 The
fact that those drugs are contained in the brand name controlled
substances for which prescriptions were written is a matter that is
easily proven and beyond dispute, and is therefore appropriate for
judicial notice.42 8
c. Proof of the Identity of the Drug
Where possible, the prosecution of a registrant is based, in part,
on prescriptions that were filled in an undercover operation so that
the drug obtained can be chemically analyzed and produced in
court.4 29 At other times, it may become necessary to prove that the
drug called for in a prescription was actually dispensed. This is nec-
essary to prove that it was not actually some other drug that was
dispensed, even though the act of dispensing is long past and the
drugs long gone.430 In these circumstances, the proof offered con-
sists of testimony relating to how such drugs are obtained, safe-
guarded, and dispensed in the ordinary course of business. For
example, in State v. Espinosa,431 the court summarized the pharma-
cist's testimony in a case where the government sought to prove that
426. FED. R. EvID. 201(g). In civil cases, the jury is instructed that it shall accept
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. Id.
427. 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (1992); see generally 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE UNITED STATES RULES § 200[02] (1991).
428. United States v. Harrison, 651 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir. July 1981) (noticing
that the generic names of the four drugs charged were listed in the C.F.R. schedules
for controlled substances).
429. See Lane, supra note 253 (discussing methods of organizing and using evi-
dence obtained during undercover operations).
430. E.g., Smith v. State, 249 S.E.2d 353, 355 (Ga. App. Ct. 1978) (accepting as
sufficient evidence testimony that appellant took drugs from labelled bottle); People
v. Nelson, 225 N.E.2d 820, 823-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967) (finding that drug containers
obtained by the defendant were labelled by manufacturer), affd, 238 N.E.2d 378
(Ill. 1968); State v. Wagner, 85 So.2d 272, 273 (La. 1956) (finding that the State
satisfied its obligation by showing the narcotic passed from the hands of a physician
to the defendant); State v. Espinosa, 66 So.2d 323, 326 (La. 1953) (finding that the
State satisfied its obligation by tracing the narcotic from its source into the hands of
the defendant).
431. 66 So.2d 323 (La. 1953).
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the defendant had in fact obtained Dilaudid pursuant to a prescrip-
tion found in a pharmacy. The pharmacist who filled the prescrip-
tion testified that the Dilaudid:
[h]ad been obtained by her from the wholesale drug firm of
McKesson and Robbins upon her filling out and tendering to
them an official narcotic form; ... that upon receiving same...
she placed the Dilaudid tablets in a narcotic drawer; that she
was the sole custodian of the narcotic drawer which she kept
under lock and key, and that the Dilaudid tablets.., handed
over by her to the defendant were taken from the original re-
ceptacle which she had personally received from McKesson and
Robbins.432
The use of such circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the
nature and quantity of the drug in question.433
d. Expert Testimony
The jury's determination of whether a registrant's professional
practice is bona fide is based on the evidence relating to the particu-
lar transactions charged and surrounding circumstances.43 4 The fail-
ure to act within the usual course of medical practice for a legitimate
medical purpose is usually proven, in part, through expert testi-
mony.435 The use of expert testimony to establish the standard of
medical practice is widely accepted in cases involving physicians 43 6
and pharmacists.43 7 As one court noted, "[T]o reach its decision the
jury needed medical testimony as to what the drug is, how it is prop-
432. Id. at 326.
433. E.g., United States v. lacoppelli, 483 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1973).
434. United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268,272 (5th Cir. 1973) (quoting Linder v.
United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925)).
435. E.g., United States v. Davis, 564 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1973).
436. E.g., United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135, 1145 (6th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 620 (9th Cir. 1990) (including expert testimony by
both prosecution and defense); United States v. Betancourt, 734 F.2d 750, 757 (11th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Varma, 691 F.2d 460, 462 (10th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Smurthwaite, 590 F.2d 889, 891 (10th Cir. 1979) (involving a physician specializing
in naturopathy). See also United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1153 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1036 (1987); United States v. Guerrero, 650 F.2d 728,
732 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981); White v. United States, 399 F.2d 813, 819-20 (8th
Cir. 1968); Reeves v. United States, 263 F. 690, 691-92 (5th Cir. 1920); Melanson v.
United States, 256 F. 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1919).
437. Hughes, 895 F.2d at 1142; United States v. Lawson, 682 F.2d 480, 482 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982).
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erly used, how it can be abused and the medical profession's view of
the drug."438 Additionally, given the professional status of the de-
fendant the government almost universally offers expert testimony
to overcome any appearance of legitimacy that status alone may
confer on the defendant, and to reinforce its case with the jury.4 3 9
However, expert testimony is not required for a successful prosecu-
tion;' 4 and when offered, the jury is not bound to accept that
testimony.441
Rules 702 and 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence control the
admissibility of expert opinion. Opinion testimony by an expert is
permitted to assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or
in determining a fact in issue." 2 Such testimony may even embrace
an "ultimate issue." 443 In the prosecution of a physician, another
physician is generally called as an expert witness to explain the
proper procedures for prescribing a controlled substance and to
opine on whether the prescription of drugs in the instances charged
was justified.' 4
In the author's experience, the prosecution's expert witness will
generally testify that proper procedures consist of the following ac-
tions. Prior to the prescription of any medication, a physician will
usually obtain a medical history of the patient including childhood
diseases, family diseases, and allergies, followed by a history of the
438. Betancourt, 734 F.2d at 757.
439. See infra note 444.
440. E.g., United States v. Jamieson, 806 F.2d 949, 951 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating
that "the very facts and circumstances surrounding the issuance of a drug prescrip-
tion can support a finding that the prescription was not issued for a legitimate medi-
cal purpose"); United States v. Word, 806 F.2d 658, 662-64 (6th Cir. 1986)
(concluding that there was sufficient evidence, without expert testimony, to show
that defendant's conduct was not in the usual course of professional practice), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987); United States v. Rogers, 609 F.2d 834, 839 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding that expert testimony is not absolutely necessary); Smurthwaite, 590
F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1979) (concluding that expert testimony is not necessary where
the issue is clear); United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385, 387 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1973) (stating that a jury is not bound
by expert testimony and may consider other testimony).
441. Bartee, 479 F.2d at 488.
442. FED. R. EvID. 702.
443. FED. R. Evm. 704(a).
444. See United States v. Rosen, 448 F. Supp. 926, 932 (E.D. La. 1977). A phar-
macologist has been qualified to give this type of testimony. See Henry R. Rich-
mond & Daryle A. Jordan, Doctors and the Distribution of Drugs, ARmy LAw.,
Sept. 1991, at 8.
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particular complaint for which that patient is seeking treatment. 44
The physician then conducts a general physical examination includ-
ing a check of the eyes, ears, nose, throat, chest, heart, lungs, blood
pressure, and extremities followed by an examination focused on
the particular problem. As an adjunct to the examination, all appro-
priate tests are conducted." 6 The physician then forms a tentative
diagnosis and treatment plan. The important information gathered
during this process is recorded in the patient's record. Follow-up
visits consist of a history of the complaint and an appropriate exami-
nation. The physician will also review the treatment history and ef-
fectiveness. Further testing will be conducted as warranted. The
expert may also testify to the prescribing practices of the medical
community relating to the drugs at issue, including whether they are
the drugs of choice within the prescribing community.
Fimally, the expert will review the transactions presented during
the course of the trial and offer an opinion as to their legitimacy.447
This testimony may take the form of a hypothetical question.44  Ex-
pert testimony in the form of handwriting analysis may also be of-
fered to prove that the defendant physician wrote the prescriptions
with which he has been charged.449
In summary, expert testimony on the following topics relating to
physicians is acceptable:
1. The customary procedures followed by licensed medical
practitioners in treating a patient prior to prescribing a con-
445. E.g., United States v. Chin, 795 F.2d 496,500 (5th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Thompson, 624 F.2d 740,741 (5th Cir. 1980); Smurthwaite, 590 F.2d at 892; United
States v. Moore, 505 F.2d 426, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 122 (1975); Ro-
sen, 444 F. Supp. at 932.
446. E.g., United States v. Kirk, 584 F.2d 773, 785 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1048 (1978); United States v. Dallman, 32 M.J. 624, 627 (A.C.M.R. 1991).
447. See Richmond & Jordan, supra note 444, at 8.
448. E.g., United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135, 1145 (6th Cir. 1990).
449. United States v. Millen, 594 F.2d 1085, 1086 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
829 (1979). This element of proof is often resolved through a stipulation that the
defendant wrote the prescriptions charged in the indictment. United States v. John-
son, 831 F.2d 124 (6th Cir. 1987). Authorship can also be proven by the testimony of
an eyewitness to the prescription writing, usually the patient or undercover officer
who obtained it. United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1985).
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trolled substance,45° including the importance of taking a thor-
ough medical history;45'
2. The importance of adequate warnings to the patient
about the medication such as information about possible side
effects; 452
3. The adequacy of the examinations conducted by the de-
fendant physician;' 53
4. The adequacy of the records kept by the defendant
physician;454
5. The medical appropriateness of the prescriptions written
by the defendant physician;455
6. The quantity of controlled substance prescriptions writ-
ten by the physician;456
7. The usual medical procedures to be followed in prescrib-
ing the controlled substances in question;457 and,
8. Whether the defendant physician was prescribing drugs
in the usual course of professional practice and for a legitimate
medical purpose.458
450. United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618,620 (9th Cir. 1990); Hughes, 895 F.2d
at 1145; United States v. Varma, 691 F.2d 460,463 (10th Cir. 1982); Kirk, 584 F.2d at
785; United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 199 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1031 (1976); United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062, 1072-73 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975).
451. Chin, 795 F.2d at 500; Thompson, 624 F.2d at 741; Rogers, 609 F.2d at 838;
Smurthwaite, 590 F.2d at 889-91; Kirk, 584 F.2d at 785; United States v. Roya, 574
F.2d 386, 394 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 857 (1978); United States v. Davis, 564
F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United States v. Green-
field, 554 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); Green, 511
F.2d at 1073; Moore, 505 F.2d at 448; White v. United States, 399 F.2d 813, 818 (8th
Cir. 1968); Rosen, 448 F. Supp. at 932.
452. Kirk, 584 F.2d at 785; United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46, 50 (5th Cir.
1978).
453. Chin, 795 F.2d at 500; Jackson, 576 F.2d at 50; Moore, 505 F.2d at 447-48.
454. Jackson, 576 F.2d at 50.
455. United States v. Varma, 691 F.2d 460, 464 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Rogers, 609 F.2d 834, 839 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Plesons, 560 F.2d 890, 891
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
456. United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1486 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Hammond, 781 F.2d 1536, 1537 (1lth Cir. 1986); United States v. Rogers, 609 F.2d
834, 838-39 (5th Cir. 1980).
457. E.g., United States v. Hooker, 541 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Rosen, 448 F. Supp. 926, 932 (E.D. La. 1977).
458. See United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135, 1144-45 (6th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Chin, 795 F.2d
496, 504 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hoffner, 777 F.2d 1423, 1426 (10th Cir.
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Expert testimony is also offered in the prosecution of pharma-
cists. Such testimony has been offered to support the contention
that the pharmacist knew or should have known that the prescrip-
tions being filled were not issued in the usual course of medical
treatment for a legitimate medical need.459 In the author's experi-
ence, the expert witness will generally testify that a pharmacist first
checks a prescription for a controlled substance to make sure that it
is in the correct form and contains all of the required information.
If the pharmacist is unfamiliar with the prescribing physician, a tele-
phone call may be made to the physician's office in an attempt to
determine whether the doctor issued the prescription. Verification
by the physician's office does not necessarily mean the prescription
is legitimate because either the doctor may be involved in the ille-
gality, or the prescription may be bogus and the telephone is being
answered by a co-conspirator whose job is to verify prescriptions.
The pharmacist will then determine whether there is a relationship
between the customer and the pharmacy; customers generally pa-
tronize a pharmacy that is located near home, work, or the doctor's
office. If the controlled substance is a popular "street drug," or one
not usually prescribed, the pharmacist may observe the customer to
determine if he appears to need the drug and may inquire as to the
reasons for it. A pharmacist can always avoid filling a prescription
by claiming to be out of stock of the prescribed drug.
The expert may also testify as to the rules and regulations affect-
ing the dispensing of controlled substances and how they are prop-
erly implemented.460 Finally, experts will give their opinions of
1985); United States v. Rogers, 609 F.2d 834, 838-39 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Potter, 616 F.2d 384, 387 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 832 (1980); United
States v. Kirk, 584 F.2d 773,784 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1978); United
States v. Roya, 574 F.2d 386, 394 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 857 (1978); United
States v. Davis, 564 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978);
United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Vig-
lia, 549 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); United States v.
Moore, 505 F.2d 426, 447-48 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
459. E.g., Hammond, 781 F.2d at 1538.
460. United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207,213-14 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980). In Seelig, a DEA Compliance Officer was allowed to testify about the
regulations relating to the filling of certain prescriptions and "what the routine prac-
tices of pharmacists should be according to the regulations" based on his expertise as
a compliance officer. Id.
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whether the defendant pharmacist's actions were illegal.461 Expert
testimony indicates that the following factors are evidence of illegal
prescribing that a pharmacist should recognize:
1. The volume of prescriptions for controlled substances by
a single physician; 2
2. The lack of individual dosing indicated by a lack of varia-
tion of the quantity of pills dispensed among patients;463 and
3. The custom or routine of local pharmacists, such as their
practices in dispensing Schedule V drugs.
4 64
2. Jury Instructions
Jury instructions generally begin with an instruction on the ele-
ments of the offense. This instruction must include all relevant stat-
utory definitions.465 When a physician is on trial for illegal
distribution through the issuance of prescriptions, the jury charge
needs to indicate that the government must prove the following ele-
ments beyond a reasonable doubt:
1) [The] defendant was a registrant authorized to dispense con-
trolled substances for legitimate medical purposes; 2) that the
defendant knowingly and intentionally issued a prescription; 3)
that the prescription was for a Schedule - controlled sub-
stance as alleged; and 4) that the prescription was issued by him
other than in good faith, without a legitimate medical purpose
and outside of the usual course of his professional practice.466
461. Hammond, 781 F.2d at 1538. See United States v. Barbacoff, 416 F. Supp.
606, 609 (D.D.C. 1976); United States v. Williams, 416 F. Supp. 611, 613 (D.D.C.
1976).
462. United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1487 (6th Cir. 1986); Hammond, 781
F.2d at 1538.
463. Hammond, 781 F.2d at 1538; United States v. Lawson, 682 F.2d 480,482-83
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982).
464. Seelig, 622 F.2d at 216 (holding that the defense should have been allowed
to offer testimony about the customary practice in handling Schedule V drugs, par-
ticularly when the government had offered expert testimony as to what the regula-
tions required).
465. Seelig, 622 F.2d at 213 (holding that defendants are entitled to have all rele-
vant statutory definitions read to the jury).
466. United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1086 (1987). See also United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir.
1986); United States v. Jamieson, 605 F. Supp. 119, 122 (D. Kan. 1985), affd, 806
F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1986).
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In the trial of a physician, the court must instruct the jury that the
defendant is exempt from the Act unless the physician was acting
outside the usual course of professional practice.467 This is true
even if the distribution is not alleged to have been pursuant to the
defendant's registration.468 The courts prefer an affirmative instruc-
tion clarifying that "a registrant who does prescribe in the usual
course of professional practice is not subject to the penalties" of the
CSA.469 The instruction should state cleariy that a conviction is
only proper where the doctor issued a prescription other than in
good faith, without a legitimate medical purpose, and outside of
medical standards generally recognized and accepted.470
467. Seelig, 622 F.2d at 213; United States v. Rogers, 609 F.2d 834, 839 (5th Cir.
1980); Hayes, 595 F.2d at 259 n.2.
468. United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 1978).
469. United States v. Plesons, 560 F.2d 890, 896 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
966 (1977).
The following instruction correctly states the rights of a physician under the CSA:
[The] defendant, a doctor of medicine, is exempt from the provision... [of the
Act], if you find that he wrote prescriptions for the persons referred to in the
evidence in the course of his professional practice; that the law permits the de-
fendant, being a doctor of medicine, to write prescriptions for the drugs re-
ferred to in the evidence, and unless you find and believe that he did not
prescribe the drugs in the course of his professional practice, then you must
acquit him.
You are further instructed that under the statute, a physician is exempted
from the prohibitions against the sale and delivery, or causing the sale or deliv-
ery of... [a controlled substance] only when he acts in the ordinary and author-
ized course of his practice.
White v. United States, 399 F.2d 813, 816-17 (8th Cir. 1968). See also Carroll, 518
F.2d at 190 (approving the instruction in White).
470. United States v. Boettjer, 569 F.2d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 976 (1978). The Ninth Circuit in Boetijer emphasized the need for clarity and
expressed concern with regard to potentially ambiguous instructions. Id. Note,
however, that the Fifth Circuit in Norris approved the following instruction, which is
not entirely clear on this point:
A controlled substance is prescribed by a physician in the usual course of a
professional practice, and, therefore, lawfully, if the substance is prescribed by
him in good faith, medically treating a patient in accordance with a standard of
medical practice generally recognized and accepted in the United States.
Norris, 780 F.2d at 1209. See also United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062, 1071 n.22
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975). This instruction is problematic because
of inherent ambiguities. For example, a jury may incorrectly interpret this instruc-
tion to permit a finding of guilt merely on the basis of malpractice. The Ninth Cir-
cuit preferred a modified version of this instruction in United States v. Davis, 564
F.2d 840, 845-46 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978). That instruction
read:
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A "good faith medical treatment instruction" informs the jury
that:
In order to determine whether or not a prescription or pre-
scriptions were issued in the course of a defendant physician's
professional practice, you may consider all of the evidence of
circumstances surrounding the prescribing of the substance in
question, the statements of the parties to the prescription trans-
action, any expert testimony as to what is the usual course of
medical practice, and any other competent evidence bearing on
the purpose for which the substances in question were
prescribed.
Unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that an act of
prescribing charged in the indictment against a defendant phy-
sician was not done by the physician in the course of his profes-
sional practice, then you should find him not guilty.47
The "usual course of professional practice" is an objective stan-
dard.47 2 A physician cannot argue that he alone can determine what
constitutes proper medical practice.4 73 The jury should consider
whether a defendant subjectively considered that his actions were
pursuant to a legitimate medical reason,47 4 as well as whether the
drugs were objectively dispensed in the usual course of a profes-
sional practice.475
In the case of a pharmacist, the jury is instructed that it first must
find that the prescriptions in question were not issued in the usual
course of professional practice for a legitimate medical reason and
that the defendant pharmacist knew that fact.4 76 The elements of
[Y]ou must also find beyond a reasonable doubt that a physician, who know-
ingly and intentionally, did dispense or distribute by prescription certain con-
trolled substances and did so other than in good faith and not in the usual
course of a professional practice, and not in accordance with a standard of med-
ical practice generally recognized and accepted in the United States.
Id. at 845-46.
471. Green, 511 F.2d at 1071 n.22; see also United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618,
623-24 (9th Cir. 1990).
472. Norris, 780 F.2d at 1209.
473. Id. Accord United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146,1153 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1036 (1987).
474. See, e.g., Norris, 780 F.2d at 1209 n.2 (approving an instruction with both
objective and subjective considerations).
475. Id. at 1209.
476. United States v. Kershman, 555 F.2d 198, 200 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 892 (1977).
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the offense for a pharmacist are: "[T]he defendant distributed a
controlled substance as charged; he did so other than in the usual
course of his profession; and he acted knowingly and
intentionally. 477
The key question of knowledge may be shown "by proof that the
defendant deliberately closed his eyes to the true nature of the pre-
scription" under appropriate circumstances.478 The instruction must
require the jury to find that the pharmacist "deliberately and con-
sciously closed his eyes;" a reasonable man standard does not ap-
ply.479 As with the case of a physician, the jury should be instructed
that if the pharmacist believed in good faith that the prescription
was properly issued, he is excepted from criminal responsibility.480
An instruction indicating that the state supervisory authorities'
failure to act does not constitute a defense is only appropriate with
regard to the issue of the defendant's intent.481
E. Sentencing
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provides for the development
of guidelines for the sentencing of persons convicted in the federal
courts.' 8 The Act established the United States Sentencing Com-
mission to promulgate the required guidelines.483 The guidelines,
which went into effect on November 1, 1987, set forth the methodol-
ogy to determine the length of sentences in federal court.484
Under the guidelines, the weight of the controlled substance is a
factor in determining the appropriate sentence for illegal distribu-
tion.485 The greater the weight, the higher the sentence.486 No pre-
477. United States v. Irwin, 661 F.2d 1063, 1070 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 907 (1982). Accord United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 197
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1976); United States v. Plesons, 560 F.2d
890, 896-97 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
478. United States v. Lawson, 682 F.2d 480, 482 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
991 (1982); United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207,213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980); Kershman, 555 F.2d at 200-01.
479. Kershman, 555 F.2d at 201.
480. Id.
481. United States v. Hammond, 781 F.2d 1536, 1540-41 (11th Cir. 1986).
482. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. 1992).
483. Id.
484. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL 1, 2-4
(1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
485. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (1993).
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scription controlled substance is pure, as each contains additives
necessary to form the tablet or solution containing the controlled
substance. Under the guidelines, however, prescription controlled
substances are treated as a "mixture" containing the controlled sub-
stance.' Therefore, the appropriate "weight" is the actual weight
of the tablets involved. If the actual pills are unavailable, an esti-
mated weight is acceptable.'
A court cannot impose probation with the condition that the de-
fendant surrender his state license to practice his profession if an
established state procedure regarding revocation exists. In United
States v. Sterber,489 the Second Circuit held that since the State of
New York had an elaborate scheme for resolving allegations of pro-
fessional misconduct against pharmacists, the trial court acted im-
properly when it required Sterber to surrender his license as a
special condition of probation.4"
F. Forfeiture
The CSA provides for the forfeiture of conveyances, real prop-
erty, and assets connected with or derived from violations of the
Act.49 1 Conveyances used or intended to be used to "transport, or
in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt" of con-
trolled substances are forfeited.49  Also forfeited is:
All real property, including any right, title, and interest (includ-
ing any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of
486. Id. The guidelines define "weight" as "the entire weight of any mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of the controlled substance." Id. at 86.
487. See United States v. Young, 992 F.2d 207, 209 (8th Cir. 1993) (Dilaudid
tablets); United States v. Blythe, 944 F.2d 356, 362-63 (7th Cir. 1991) (Dilaudid
tablets); United States v. Shabazz, 933 F.2d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir.) (Dilaudid pills),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 431 (1991). See also Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct.
1919 (1991) (holding that the weight of the blotter paper containing LSD, not the
weight of the pure LSD, controls).
488. Shabazz, 933 F.2d at 1034. The weight of a Dilaudid tablet was estimated
to be 90 milligrams based on information from the DEA, the Physicians' Desk Ref-
erence, and the manufacturer of the pill. Id. at 1031-34.
489. 846 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1988). This case was decided under the Federal Pro-
bation Act which has since been repealed. However, the logic of the case is applica-
ble to any situation where probation would be available under the sentencing
guidelines.
490. Id. at 844.
491. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)-(7) (Supp. 1992).
492. Id. § 881(a)(4).
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land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used or
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to
facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter.
493
Finally, for "all moneys.., or other things of value furnished by any
person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this
subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange" are for-
feited.494 Forfeiture under these provisions does not require a fed-
eral criminal prosecution and has been applied to defendants in
state criminal proceedings.4
95
These provisions have been applied to the assets of practitioners.
For example, on two separate occasions, the Fourth Circuit has af-
firmed decisions granting forfeiture of buildings housing physicians'
offices based on the physicians' convictions for illegal distribution of
controlled substances.496 In the earlier opinion, the Fourth Circuit
noted that it was not holding that "any writing of an illegal prescrip-
tion on a given property automatically renders the property forfeita-
ble., 497 Rather, the court held that forfeiture was mandated where
the office had been used over forty times to write illegal prescrip-
tions during a four-month period because a direct and continuing
relationship existed between the property and the crimes.498 In a
later case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding that
the offending physician wrote illegal prescriptions in his office for a
particular patient499 and that the building was "substantially con-
nected to the illegal distribution of controlled substances." 5"
493. Id. § 881(a)(7).
494. Id. § 881(a)(6).
495. E.g., Brantz v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 767 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
496. United States v. Cullen, 979 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Schif-
ferli, 895 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1990).
497. Schifferli, 895 F.2d at 991.
498. Id. The district court, in upholding the forfeiture, noted that there was a
substantial connection between the property and the illegal activity because (1) the
practice had to have a situs to give it legitimacy and (2) the doctor received money
for the illegal prescriptions on the premises. United States v. 117 Trafalgar Street
S.W., 700 F. Supp. 857, 862 (D.S.C. 1988), affd sub nom. United States v. Schifferli,
895 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1990).
499. Cullen, 979 F.2d at 994.
500. Id. at 995.
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The forfeiture of assets allegedly traced to illegal proceeds has
also been applied in the registrant context.501 Additionally, forfei-
ture may be based on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act (RICO)."° The Fourth Circuit used that statute to
prosecute a physician for "conducting the affairs of his medical prac-
tice through a pattern of racketeering activity."503
IV. CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Not only are there criminal penalties such as incarceration and
criminal fines for violations of the Controlled Substances Act, there
are civil penalties as well. These penalties can be used as an alterna-
tive to or in addition to criminal prosecution.5 4
The Act establishes original federal court civil jurisdiction to en-
force civil penalties of up to $25,000.505 The civil penalty may be
imposed for any of the following violations: (1) wrongful distribu-
tion or dispensing of a controlled substance; (2) failure to keep or
furnish required records; (3) refusal of entry for an administrative
inspection; and (4) distribution without adequate registration. °6
The charges in civil cases brought under the Act against pharmacists
have been for filling prescriptions with mechanically reproduced sig-
natures, 07 filling incomplete prescriptions,50 8 filling forged prescrip-
tions,"°  failing to maintain proper records,51 0  and filling
501. Brantz v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 767, 768 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (upholding
seizure of physician's automobile for violating this provision).
502. Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-902, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1992)).
503. United States v. Borromeo, 954 F.2d 245, 246 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 25 (1992).
504. Excessive civil fines after the imposition of criminal sanctions for the same
offense may violate the double jeopardy clause if the fines are characterized as de-
terrent or retributive. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
505. 21 U.S.C. § 842(c)(1) (Supp. 1992).
506. Id. § 842. An unregistered physician who distributes controlled substances
is properly penalized under § 842(a)(1) and not under § 842(a)(2), which applies to
registrants. United States v. Clinical Leasing Serv., Inc., 930 F.2d 394, 395 n.1 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 188 (1991).
507. United States v. Barbacoff, 416 F. Supp. 606, 610 (D.D.C. 1976); United
States v. Williams, 416 F. Supp. 611, 614 (D.D.C. 1976).
508. Williams, 416 F. Supp. at 614.
509. Barbacoff, 416 F. Supp. at 607-09; Williams, 416 F. Supp. at 613.
510. United States v. Green Drugs, 905 F.2d 694 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
985 (1990); Barbacoff, 416 F. Supp. at 607-08; Williams, 416 F. Supp. at 614.
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prescriptions that were not issued in the course of legitimate medi-
cal treatment.511 Charges have also been brought against a clinic
and its physicians for distributing controlled substances without the
required registration.512 Each separate act in violation of any one of
these provisions can result in the maximum fine.5 13
The United States Attorney's Office seeks to impose civil penal-
ties by filing a civil complaint.5" 4 In determining the amount of the
fine, the court should consider: "(1) [T]he willfulness of the viola-
tions; (2) how much the defendant earned as the result of his unlaw-
ful activities; (3) the harm to the public; and (4) the financial
capacity of the defendant to pay. 515
The Act imposes strict liability for civil violations, and inadvertent
mistake is not a defense to liability.51 6 In United States v. Green
Drugs,51 7 the government sought the imposition of civil penalties on
a drugstore for shortages of Schedule II controlled substances.518
Even though the drugstore claimed inadvertent recordkeeping fail-
ures and lack of pecuniary gain, liability was found. 519 However, the
apparent "innocence" of the store was reflected in the imposition of
only a $2,000 penalty per count.520
With the strict liability requirement, civil penalties constitute a
strong weapon in the hands of prosecutors. It is surprising that pros-
ecutors do not invoke these provisions more frequently.
V. CONCLUSION
The Controlled Substances Act creates a complex web of adminis-
trative, civil, and criminal regulations designed to regulate the distri-
bution of controlled substances and to prevent their diversion to
illegitimate uses. Within that web, the activities of individual practi-
511. Barbacoff, 416 F. Supp. at 610; Williams, 416 F. Supp. at 614.
512. Clinical Leasing Serv., 925 F.2d at 120.
513. Green Drugs, 905 F.2d at 695. One count was brought for each controlled
substance for which it was alleged that the store had failed to maintain accurate
records. Id.
514. E.g., Green Drugs, 905 F.2d at 695.
515. Williams, 416 F. Supp. at 614. See also Barbacoff, 416 F. Supp. at 610.
516. 21 U.S.C. § 842(c) (Supp. 1992).
517. 905 F.2d 694 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 985 (1990).
518. Id. at 695.
519. Id. at 698.
520. Id. at 695.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/4
1994] PRESCRIPTION DRUG CONTROL 119
tioners are circumscribed and their professional judgments are sub-
ject to examination. When confronted with allegations of diversion,
legal practitioners must familiarize themselves fully with both the
medical and legal aspects of the case.
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